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COPYRIGHT’S HAND ABSTRACTIONS TEST FOR 
PATENT’S SECTION 101 SUBJECT-MATTER 
ELIGIBILITY 
Mark R. Carter† 
Abstract 
Since the Federal Circuit’s 2007 In re Bilski decision and the 
Supreme Court’s 2008 Bilski v. Kappos decision, patent law’s 
subject-matter eligibility standard under 35 U.S.C. §101 has been 
uncertain. This paper posits patent law’s patent-ineligible abstract 
ideas are science concepts and science laws, composed of science 
concepts, as defined by science philosophers. Somewhat analogous to 
copyright law, it also presents a downward patent-eligibility Hand 
abstractions test from an alleged abstract idea, natural law,  or 
natural phenomenon to independent claims as a coherent, systematic, 
and practical approach to judging utility-patent eligibility. Patent 
claims manifest an innate vertical abstractions ladder, so there is no 
need to further abstract ideas from the claims. The fact-finder must 
add features to the alleged abstract idea, natural law, or natural 
phenomenon to move down the abstractions ladder to see whether an 
independent claim merges with the abstract idea, natural law, or 
natural phenomenon while combating human compulsions, and the 
test’s known bias, toward over-abstraction. The test automatically 
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adjusts to ever-changing science concepts and laws and their word 
expressions. 
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I. COPYRIGHTS, PATENTS, & THE HAND ABSTRACTIONS TEST 
Though William Landes and Richard Posner hinted at applying 
copyright analysis to patents,
1
 almost no one has written about the 
Hand abstractions test (abstractions test) applied to patent law.
2
 
In 1995, before Landes and Posner, Maximillian Peterson 
analogized copyright’s idea–expression split with patent’s machine–
program split under Section 101.
3
  Like Judge Learned Hand’s 
confession that deciding between ideas and expression in any 
copyright suit requires ad hoc judgment,
4
 Peterson concluded that 
deciding between patentable machines and unpatentable algorithms in 
any suit requires resorting to policy.
5
 
In the past three years, two authors have applied copyright’s 
abstractions test to patent law.  First, Tun-Jen Chiang focused on 
defining the invention and deciding enablement and patent scope.
6
  
He found an abstractions problem in patent law by deeming a patent’s 
specification and claims separately define the “invention.”7  Chiang 
also proposed identifying the invention by idea novelty rather than by 
embodiments.
8
  Chiang focused on the written description and 
enablement requirements.
9
  But, unlike Peterson, by focusing on 
claim construction and enablement, Chiang in essence assumed 
eligibility under Section 101.
10
  Second, Jeffrey E. Young proposed 
applying the abstractions test to patent-eligibility.
11
 
Two decades ago, John Shepard Wiley Jr. tried to make 
 
 1. WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 305-06 (2003). 
 2. Nick v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930). 
 3. Maximillian R. Peterson, Now You See It, Now You Don’t: Was it a Patentable 
Machine or an Unpatentable “Algorithm”? On Principle and Expediency in Current Patent 
Law Doctrine Relating to Computer/Implemented Inventions¸ 64 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 90, 124-
26 (1995). 
 4. Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960) 
(Hand, J.). 
 5. Peterson, supra note 3, at 124-26. 
 6. Tun-Jen Chiang, Defining Patent Scope by the Novelty of the Idea, 89 WASH. U. L. 
REV. 1211 (2012) [hereinafter Chiang, Patent Scope]; Tun-Jen Chiang, The Levels of 
Abstraction Problem in Patent Law, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 1097, 1101, 1118-22 (2011) 
[hereinafter Chiang, Levels of Abstraction]. 
 7. Chiang, Levels of Abstraction, supra note 6, at 1101, 1118-22; see also Christopher 
A. Cotropia, What is the Invention?, 53 WM. & MARY. L. REV. 1855 (2012). 
 8. Chiang, Patent Scope, supra note 6, at 1212. 
 9. Chiang, Levels of Abstraction, supra note 6, at 1102-03. 
 10. See id. 
 11. Jeffrey E. Young, A Level of Abstraction Approach for Post-Bilski § 101 Analysis, 84 
PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. 875 (2012). 
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copyright law more coherent by applying patent law concepts.
12
  First, 
he proposed redefining copyright’s originality by “conditional 
investment,” somewhat like patent’s ordinary skill in the art.13  
Second, he proposed scrapping the idea–abstraction distinction for a 
“conditional creation” subject to something like examining a patent.14 
This paper more thoroughly applies the abstractions test to 
patent-eligibility.  My approach differs from Chiang’s and Young’s 
approaches.  First, unlike Chiang and Young, I see an innate 
abstraction ladder/hierarchy in each patent’s claim structure.  In 
practice, the whole point in writing claims is to abstract invention 
concepts.  Second, unlike Chiang, I assume the standard “unitary” 
invention patent view; the specification includes the claims and 
together they describe one invention. Third, unlike Chiang, I focus on 
patentable subject matter rather than novelty and nonobviousness 
patentability.  Fourth, I compare patent claims with natural laws.  
Young expressly shunned this comparison.
15
 
Part II of this paper highlights the patent-eligibility history 
leading to the current controversy.  Part III makes plain many innate 
problems driving the controversy.  Part IV explains why copyright 
tools might help understand patent law given a history of cross-over 
analysis and compares copyright’s idea-expression split with patent’s 
abstract idea-invention split.  It also describes copyright concepts tied 
to the abstractions test in copyright.  As copyright attaches to a work 
without examination, courts almost always test copyrightability 
during infringement suits.  Part V then presents the downward patent-
eligibility Hand abstractions test (patent-eligibility abstractions test) 
for patent-eligibility.  Part VI then defines patent-ineligible abstract 
ideas and laws of nature sitting atop the downward patent-eligibility 
abstractions test as science concepts and science laws built on those 
concepts.  Finally, Part VII applies the downward patent-eligibility 
abstractions test to claims in the recent case CLS Bank International 
v. Alice Corp. 
 
 
 12. John Shepard Wiley Jr., Copyright at the School of Patent, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 119 
(1991). 
 13. Id. at 120, 146-56. 
 14. Id. at 121-37, 156-66. 
 15. Young, supra note 11 (“This article has not dealt with laws of nature, the subject of 
Prometheus Laboratories Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Services.  Perhaps a similar charting of 
levels of application of a law of nature would be helpful, but that discussion is for another 
day.”). 
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II. PATENT-ELIGIBILITY’S QUAG—SOFTWARE, STATE STREET, 
AT&T, BILSKI, PROMETHEUS, & CLS BANK
16
 
Section 101 of 35 U.S.C. states: “Whoever invents or discovers 
any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of 
matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a 
patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this 
title.”17  Section 101 expressly defines four patent-eligible subjects: 1) 
processes/methods; 2) machines; 3) “manufactures,” that is, “articles 
of manufacture” or “manufactured articles”; and 4) compositions of 
matter.
18
  The Supreme Court has excluded from patent-eligibility a 
few subjects: abstract ideas, laws of nature, and natural 
phenomenon.
19
 
A. Software 
Thirty years ago, the Supreme Court finally held software tied to 
physically curing rubber to be a patent-eligible process/method under 
35 U.S.C. Section 101.
20
  Eventually, the Federal Circuit secured 
software patent-eligibility outright.
21
 
B. State Street and AT&T 
Software patent applications evolved to reach unpatentable 
business methods, namely computerized auctions.
22
  The Federal 
Circuit’s State Street Bank & Trust v. Signature Financial Group, Inc. 
decision overruled the absolute ban against business method patents 
by allowing a patent for computerized securities-portfolio 
 
 16. See generally LAWRENCE M. SUNG & JEFF E. SCHWARZ, PATENT LAW HANDBOOK 
2010–2011 § 3:2 (2010). 
 17. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2013). 
 18. Id. 
 19. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981) (citing Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 
U.S. 303, 309 (1980)); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 589 (1978) (Stevens, J.); Gottschalk v. 
Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67-68 (1974); Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Innoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 
130 (1948); Rubber-Tip Pencil Co. v Howard, 20 Wall. 498, 507 (1874); Le Roy v. Tatham, 14 
How. 156, 175 (1853)). 
 20. Compare Diehr, 450 U.S. at 185-93 (ruling a method for curing rubber by software-
controlled machines patent-eligible), with Benson, 409 U.S. at 64-67, 71-73 (ruling a software 
process converting binary coded decimals numerals to pure binary numerals patent ineligible), 
and Flook, 437 U.S. at 585-86, 594-95 (ruling a method calculating an alarm limit signaling an 
abnormal or dangerous chemical reaction patent ineligible). 
 21. In re Allapat, 33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc).  See generally AMY LANDERS, 
UNDERSTANDING PATENT LAW § 23.03 (2008). 
 22. In re Schrader, 22 F.3d 290 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 
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management.
23
  The 1952 Patent Act’s main drafter, Judge Giles S. 
Rich, wrote the State Street opinion, so it had great weight.  State 
Street rested patent-eligibility on whether an invention produced a 
useful, concrete, and tangible result.
24
  AT&T v. Excel 
Communications applied State Street to hold that a mathematical 
algorithm may be part of a patent-eligible process, creating a phone-
billing signal, without physically transforming or converting 
something.
25
  State Street and AT&T sowed the seeds for the current 
patent-eligibility controversy.
26
 
C. Bilski & Abstract Ideas  
In the past few years, courts have revisited patentable subject 
matter, that is, patent-eligibility.  The Supreme Court’s seminal 2008 
Bilski v. Kappos decision
27
 affirmed, yet criticized, the Federal 
Circuit’s en banc In re Bilski.28  Bilski involved a business method for 
hedging commodities’ trading risk.29  Both the patent examiner and 
the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences rejected the claims 
under 35 U.S.C. Section 101.
30
  But the examiner stressed that the 
claims did not involve “technological arts,” while the Board rejected 
that reasoning.
31
  On appeal at the Federal Circuit, Chief Judge 
Michel’s majority opinion also rejected the technological arts test for 
the machine-or-transformation test.  By adopting the machine-or-
transformation test as the definitive patent-eligibility test, the Federal 
Circuit, in effect, revived the business method patent ban.
32
 
In Bilski v. Kappos, a fractured Supreme Court affirmed the 
Federal Circuit’s en banc judgment while overruling its reasoning.33  
Four justices joined most of Justice Kennedy’s main opinion, but 
Justice Scalia refused to join parts II.B.2 and II.C.2.
34
  The part 
 
 23. State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 
1998) (Rich, J.). 
 24. Id. at 1373-75 (quoting In re Allapat, 33 F.3d at 1544). 
 25. AT&T Corp. v. Excel Commc’ns, Inc., 172 F.3d 1352, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
 26. See, e.g., SUNG & SCHWARZ, supra note 16, § 3.2. 
 27. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010). 
 28. 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc). 
 29. See generally GALE R. PETERSON & DERRICK A. PIZARRO, 2009 FEDERAL CIRCUIT 
YEARBOOK: PATENT LAW DEVELOPMENTS IN THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT § 1:1, 1-6 (2009). 
 30. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 950 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc). 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. at 960. 
 33. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010).  See generally SUNG & SCHWARZ, supra 
note 16, at 182-84. 
 34. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3223. 
CARTER 7/14/2014  6:56 PM 
2014] HAND ABSTRACTIONS TEST FOR SECTION 101 477 
supported by five justices critiqued the Federal Circuit for leaving the 
machine-or-transformation test as the only patent-eligibility 
standard.
35
  This part also stressed that business methods might be 
patentable.
36
 
As for the four-vote plurality opinions, section II.B.2 explained 
that the machine-or-transformation test might help decide 
patentability in modern times.
37
  For instance, computer programs are 
now patentable.
38
  Further, section II.C.2 warned that rejecting 
business methods merely because they lacked patentability until 
recently would force courts to pose unnecessarily complex questions, 
hiding patent law’s goal.39 
Justice Stevens’ four-vote concurrence agreed that the machine-
or-transformation test should not be the only test for patent-
eligibility.
40
  But, unlike Justice Kennedy, Justice Stevens absolutely 
rejected business method patent-eligibility.
41
  Yet, Justice Stevens 
seemed to endorse the technology and technological arts test rejected 
by the en banc Federal Circuit.
42
 
Justice Breyer concurred to note the other opinions’ common 
ground.
43
  Only Justice Scalia joined most, but not all, of Justice 
Breyer’s opinion.44  Justice Breyer stressed that all Justices agreed the 
claims were unpatentable, abstract, ideas.
45
  He also stressed that the 
Kennedy and Stevens opinions agreed: 1) Section 101 is broad but 
limited; 2) transformation and reduction to a different state or thing is 
a clue to patentability; 3) the machine-or-transformation test is a clue 
but not the sole test; and 4) not everything producing a useful, 
concrete, and tangible result is patent-eligible.
46
  He ended quite 
cryptically: “In sum, it is my view that, in reemphasizing that the 
‘machine-or-transformation’ test is not necessarily the sole test of 
patentability, the Court intends neither to de-emphasize the test’s 
usefulness nor to suggest that many patentable processes lie beyond 
 
 35. Id. at 3226-27. 
 36. Id. at 3228-29. 
 37. Id. at 3227-28 (Kennedy, J., plurality). 
 38. Id. at 3228-29. 
 39. Id. at 3229. 
 40. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3231-32 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 41. Id. at 3253-57. 
 42. Id. at 3244. 
 43. Id. at 3257 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3258-59. 
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its reach.”47 
In sum, the Supreme Court’s Bilski v. Kappos refused to let the 
Federal Circuit only apply the machine-or-transformation test.  It 
stated many things the Federal Circuit should not do but failed to 
positively guide the Federal Circuit on patent-eligibility. 
D. Prometheus & Natural Laws 
In 2012, the Supreme Court’s unanimous Mayo Collaborative 
Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc. decision again opined on 
patent-eligibility.
48
  The patent claimed a method for treating 
autoimmune diseases relying on the individualized metabolism of 
each person receiving a compound.
49
  The Federal Circuit had applied 
the machine-or-transformation test to uphold eligibility.
50
  The 
Supreme Court deemed a person’s reaction to a drug a natural law.51  
In rejecting eligibility, Justice Breyer stressed: 
If a law of nature is not patentable, then neither is a process 
reciting a law of nature, unless that process has additional features 
that provide practical assurance that the process is more than a 
drafting effort designed to monopolize the law of nature itself.  A 
patent, for example, could not simply recite a law of nature and 
then add the instruction “apply the law.”
52
 
Continuing, Breyer stressed the administering and determining 
steps and a (wherein) clause only: 1) referred the natural law to a 
relevant audience,  doctors; 2) told doctors to perform routine tasks, 
and 3) told doctors natural-law details.
53
  None of these claim 
elements and features made the claims patent-eligible. 
Regardless, whether Breyer’s opinion helped anyone, except the 
Supreme Court, to understand patent-eligibility, especially in Bilski’s 
wake, remains unknown. 
 
 
 
 47. Id. at 3259. 
 48. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012). 
 49. Id. at 1294-95. 
 50. Id. at 1296 (citing Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 581 F.3d 
1336, 1345, 1346-47 (Fed. Cir. 2009)). 
 51. Id. at 1296-97. 
 52. Id. at 1297. 
 53. Id. at 1297-98. 
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E. CLS Bank International v. Alice Corp. Stalemate 
In 2013, the Federal Circuit issued its en banc ruling in CLS 
Bank International v. Alice Corporation.
54
  Only four judges joined 
Judge Lourie’s “main” opinion.  The decision included five other 
opinions penned by Judges Rader, Moore, Newman, and Linn. Chief 
Judge Rader wrote two opinions.  Judge Lourie outlined a framework 
identifying and defining “whatever fundamental concept appears 
wrapped up in the claim” and then deciding whether a claim has an 
“inventive concept” adding more than the “insignificant, 
conventional, or routine.”55  But, beyond the normal hand-waving, 
Judge Lourie gave no guidance on how to recognize an abstract idea.  
Judge Rader’s first opinion stressed that no opinion garnered a 
majority, implying no resulting precedent.
56
 
This caselaw is a quite confused mess.
57
  As Mark A. Lemley 
and his coauthors quite aptly noted before CLS Bank, “[p]ut simply, 
the problem  is that no one understands what makes an idea ‘abstract,’ 
and hence ineligible for patent protection.”58 
This paper defines “abstract idea” and “natural law” for patent 
law based on philosophy of science definitions.  Inspired by 
copyright’s abstractions test, it also posits a downward patent-
eligibility abstractions test for whether a patent claim is an abstract 
idea, natural law, or natural phenomenon. 
“Abstract ideas” in patent law are science concepts.  They fall 
into three groups: classificatory, comparative, and quantitative.  
“Natural laws” in patent law are science laws.  Science laws consist 
of universal or statistical statements built on science concepts. 
Patent has links to copyright, so the abstractions test used for 
testing copyrightability is a candidate for testing patent-eligibility.  
Patent claims have a built-in vertical abstraction ladder not requiring 
any further abstraction.  In fact, further abstraction runs afoul of the 
abstraction test’s well-known over-abstraction bias in copyright and 
known human compulsions to metaphorize and abstract every object 
and concept.
59
 
A downward patent-eligibility abstractions test could test patent-
 
 54. CLS Bank Int'l. v. Alice Corp., 717 F.3d 1269 (Fed. Cir.), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 
734 (2013). 
 55. Id. at 1282-84. 
 56. Id. at 1292 n.1 (Rader, C.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
 57. See id. at 1321-22 (Newman, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
 58. Mark A. Lemley et al., Life After Bilski, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1315, 1316 (2011). 
 59. See discussion infra Part III.D-E. 
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eligibility while counteracting these biases and compulsions.  All 
patent claims are for ideas and rely on science concepts and science 
laws.  A downward abstraction from the alleged “abstract idea” (i.e., 
science concept) or “natural law” (i.e., science law) to reach the claim 
can test eligibility. 
Eligibility can vary by invention class.  The science concept–law 
distinction implies that most method claims will be tested against 
science laws, rather than science concepts. 
Further, manufactured articles and matter compositions should 
have natural objects, natural phenomenon, or math relationships atop 
the abstractions ladder. 
Finally, a downward patent-eligibility abstractions test 
accommodates changing expressions for science concepts and science 
laws.  Human expressions for science laws continually change with 
periodic revolutionary shifts.  In fact, this is the whole point of 
science.  But a downward patent-eligibility abstractions test only 
judges how abstract ideas and natural laws relate to claims.  Like a 
math relation, the test plugs in an alleged science concept or science 
law at the ladder’s top and the claim under test at the ladder’s bottom.  
The downward patent-eligibility abstractions test itself has a “science-
law” form composed of science concepts, for example, that it 
compares at each abstraction level.  Thus, the test remains the same 
over time, but the results of the test change as human expressions for 
science concepts and science laws change. 
Throughout this paper, I stress that patent-eligibility is distinct 
from patentability under 35 U.S.C. Section 102 novelty and Section 
103 obviousness.  But, to compare claims against science concepts or 
science laws, claims normally must meet 35 U.S.C. Section 112(b) by 
particularly pointing out their subject matter. 
III. PATENT-ELIGIBILITY’S INNATE PROBLEMS: WORDS FOR SCIENCE 
CONCEPTS & LAWS, CHANGING EXPRESSIONS, & LANGUAGE’S 
LIMITS 
We must acknowledge some problems innate to deciding patent-
eligibility before choosing a particular way to test it.  Though these 
problems may be well known separately in science, engineering, 
philosophy, linguistics, and even patent law, they are rarely stated in 
one place.  Thus, to make the problems clear and inform our best 
effort at making a patent-eligibility test, I will expressly sum them up. 
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Patent law issues patents for ideas.
60
  But, the patented idea must 
not be an abstract idea.
61
  Patent law deems “laws of nature, natural 
phenomena, and abstract ideas” as patent-ineligible subjects.62 
Our legal system demands words.  Thus, judging patent-
eligibility involves deciding whether word expressions for patent 
claims match word expression for patent-ineligible laws of nature, 
natural phenomenon, and abstract ideas. 
But, as I will detail, deciding eligibility has many innate 
problems which will guide us in formulating a patent-eligibility test.  
First, human science-concept and science-law expressions continually 
change with periodic revolutionary shifts as science progresses.  In 
fact, the whole point of science is to find these better expressions.  
Thus, what humans understand and call a “science law” will 
necessarily change. 
Second, conceptual-semantics linguistics teaches that languages 
have innate general limits in expressing concepts due to human 
nature. 
Third, though science laws expressed through math may be fairly 
precise, scientists, conceptual-semantics linguists, and philosophers 
know words break down in describing science concepts and, thus, 
science laws. 
Fourth, humans very heavily rely on metaphors, a way of 
abstracting concepts, to convey even the most sophisticated science 
concepts.  This tendency can lead to errors in comparing g science 
concepts and patent claims. 
Fifth, though humans can see parts, humans, including lawyers 
and judges, compulsively abstract concepts and objects into simple 
schematics and structureless, holistic blobs.  In essence, this is the 
well-known “my eyes glaze over” “(MEGO)” human tendency to 
gloss-over details. 
These innate problems shed light on patent law’s general claim 
language problems and its problems comparing claims with “abstract 
ideas” and “laws of nature,” that is science concepts and science laws. 
 
 60. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 1, at 305-06. 
 61. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981). 
 62. Id. 
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A. Changing Science Expressions 
1. Continual Change in Normal Science 
Albert Einstein, an ex-patent examiner and holder of dozens of 
patents, and Leopold Infeld tersely summed up the whole science 
enterprise.
63
  “Science” is a human mental construct.64  What humans 
deem reality changes as science progresses.
65
  Though humans made 
science concepts before inventing physics, physics started with the 
new quantitative concepts of mass and force and the qualitative 
concept of an inertial system.
66
  As physics progressed, it destroyed 
old concepts and created new ones to handle new phenomena such as 
magnetic fields.
67
  Also, humans replaced some universal laws over 
individual objects with statistical quantum probability laws over many 
objects.
68
 
Many scholars have agreed with Einstein and Infeld that human 
expressions of science concepts and laws continually change.  For 
instance, Rudolf Carnap stressed the changing “partial 
interpretations” of physics quantitative concepts.69  These partial 
interpretations amount to a current representation of a physics laws.
70
  
The partial interpretations change as physical concepts evolve.
71
 
John Archibald Wheeler expressed the same idea with more 
detail and with examples from chemistry and physics.
72
  “Every law 
can be transcended.”73  For instance, Daniel Bernoulli’s 1722 
proposition that heat, thermal dynamics, and temperature resulted 
from chaotic molecular motion seemed preposterous, but scientists 
now know the proposition is true.
74
  Also, chemistry once deemed 
valence laws fundamental, but they break down at high temperatures 
 
 63. ALBERT EINSTEIN & LEOPOLD INFELD, THE EVOLUTION OF PHYSICS: FROM BASIC 
CONCEPTS TO RELATIVITY AND QUANTA 294-97 (1938). 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. RUDOLF CARNAP, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 102-03 
(Martin Gardner ed., Basic Books 1974) (1966). 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. JOHN ARCHIBALD WHEELER, A QUESTION OF PHYSICS: CONVERSATIONS IN PHYSICS 
AND BIOLOGY 58-60 (Paul Buckley & F. David Peat eds., 1979). 
 73. Id. at 59. 
 74. Id. at 58. 
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and pressures.
75
  After further investigation, all physics laws “seem 
like approximations.”76 
Since Wheeler’s statements, physics has enshrined the theory 
that laws may vary with the energy scale as the “renormalization 
group.”77 
Like Wheeler, Richard Feynman stressed that physics laws 
change.
78
  For instance, Einstein’s general relativity modified 
Newton’s gravity.79  It may not be part of nature, but physics laws 
change with time.
80
 
2. Revolutionary Paradigms Shifts 
Noting more dramatic changes, Thomas Kuhn stressed “normal” 
science proceeds from seminal, “revolutionary,” science 
achievements.
81
  Kuhn’s revolutionary science examples over the ages 
include: Aristotle’s Physica, Ptolemy’s Almagest, Newton’s Principia 
and Optiks, Franklin’s Electricity, Lavoisier’s Chemistry, and Lyell’s 
Geology.
82
  Before modern science textbooks, these works left details 
to be worked out that defined the legitimate problems and methods of 
a research field for succeeding generations of practitioners.
83
  They 
were able to do so because they shared two essential characteristics.
84
 
“Their achievement was sufficiently unprecedented to attract an 
enduring group of adherents away from competing modes of 
scientific activity. Simultaneously, it was sufficiently open-ended to 
leave all sorts of problems for the redefined group of practitioners to 
resolve.”85 
Kuhn offered Einstein’s general relativity, a theory of gravity, as 
a revolutionary paradigm shift away from Newton’s laws. 
 
 
 75. Id. at 59. 
 76. Id. at 59-60. 
 77. See, e.g., MICHAEL E. PESKIN & DANIEL V. SCHROEDER, AN INTRODUCTION TO 
QUANTUM FIELD THEORY 393-438 (1995). 
 78. RICHARD FEYNMAN, THE CHARACTER OF PHYSICAL LAW 33 (M.I.T. Press 1967) 
(1965). 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 10 (2d ed. 1970) 
(emphasis added). 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. (emphasis added). 
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It has not, that is, shown Newton’s laws to be a limiting case of 
Einstein’s.  For in the passage to the limit it is not only the forms 
of laws that have changed.  Simultaneously we have had to alter 
the fundamental structural elements of which the universe to which 
they apply is composed. 
  This need to change the meaning of established and familiar 
concepts is central to the revolutionary impact of Einstein’s theory 
. . . . Just because it did not involve the introduction of additional 
objects or concepts, the transition from Newtonian to Einsteinian 
mechanics illustrates with particular clarity the scientific 
revolution as a displacement of the conceptual network through 
which scientist view the world.
86
 
Thus, human expressions of physics laws change through 
revolutionary paradigm shifts.  But, viewing Kuhn’s work in context 
of the other philosophers and scientists, expressions for physics laws 
also change through normal science. 
3. In re Bilski’s Approaches Fail to Evolve 
Chief Judge Michel’s majority opinion rejected the technological 
arts test.
87
  Judge Michel faulted the tests based on “‘technological 
arts’ and ‘technology’” for being “both ambiguous and ever 
changing.”88  But as we have seen, science concepts and laws 
continually change implying the standard for patent-eligibility must 
change to match the new concepts and laws.  Thus, the changing 
meaning of “technological arts” and “technology” fails to 
automatically knock them out for a patent-eligibility standard. 
Judge Dyk’s concurrence stressed that the dissenters, Judges 
Newman, Mayer, and Rader, ignored consistent English practice due 
to changing technology.
89
  But, as with Judge Michel’s opinion, this 
approach ignores changing human science concepts and laws. 
B. Languages’ Innate Limits in Expressing Concepts 
The linguistics subfield conceptual semantics studies word 
meaning.  According to Steven Pinker, conceptual semantics involves 
the relation of words to thoughts, human concerns, and reality.
90
  
 
 86. Id. at 102. 
 87. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 960 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc). 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 973 (Dyk, J., concurring) (quoting Malla Pollack, The Multiple 
Unconstitutionality of Business Method Patents, 28 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 61, 96 
(2002)). 
 90. STEVEN PINKER, THE STUFF OF THOUGHT: LANGUAGE AS A WINDOW TO HUMAN 
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Languages have limits in expressing concepts, including science 
concepts.
91
 
Pinker has summed up many innate characteristics and problems 
in expressing concepts in human language.
92
  Almost all human 
languages share some basic concepts.
93
  Words digitize analog 
reality.
94
  That is, words try to capture or represent human concepts 
about the reality around us; they are not the reality itself.
95
  To 
express abstract ideas, humans almost always rely on metaphors.
96
  
Words tend to reduce each entity, idea, and object to a single, holistic, 
blob without parts, though humans can articulate subparts.
97
 
This implies that humans tend to automatically think of a “patent 
claim” as an abstract blob, but humans can train themselves to think 
of the claim’s elements.  Echoing Heisenberg and other science 
philosophers,
98
 everyday concepts break down for modern science 
and modern non-local property, for instance, patents and copyrights.
99
  
Echoing Heisenberg’s thoughts, Pinker notes humans give old 
expressions new meanings and make new ones to describe science 
concepts and laws.
100
  Ironically, Pinker notes many semantic 
problems climax in engineering and law, the two most important 
fields for patent law.
101
 
C. Break Down of Words in Describing Science Concepts & 
Science Laws 
Word ambiguities are a well-known in patent law.  “Patent claim 
drafting is an art, not a precise science. There is no correct or best 
claim.”102  In fact, word ambiguities are the main problem in drafting 
and interpreting patent claims.  Yet, law demands words for statutes, 
regulations, contracts, and patent claims as legal systems must apply 
 
THOUGHT (2007). 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 428-38. 
 93. Id. at 81-82. 
 94. Id. at 3-4, 428. 
 95. Id. at 4-6, 153-234. 
 96. PINKER, supra note 90, at 6, 235-78. 
 97. Id. at 429. 
 98. Infra Part III.C. 
 99. See id. at 433-34. 
 100. Id. at 257. 
 101. Id. at 225, 228. 
 102. See, e.g., ROBERT C. FABER, FABER ON MECHANICS OF CLAIM DRAFTING § 10.1 (6th 
ed. 2012). 
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to a quite broad range of situations.  Acknowledging the innate 
problem with words for describing science and engineering, the U.S. 
Patent and Trademark Office stresses “[a] fundamental principle . . . 
is that applicants are their own lexicographers. They can define in the 
claims . . . in whatever terms they choose so long as any special 
meaning assigned to a term is clearly set forth in the specification.”103 
Philosophers and scientists have noted innate problems 
expressing science concepts and laws in words.  As our legal system 
demands words to judge whether a patent claim is only an abstract 
idea or law of nature, their insights will help judge whether a patent 
claim is ineligible. 
1. Science Concepts 
Words innately poorly express science concepts. Heisenberg and 
Feynman noted that physicists use a math language but must rely on 
words to describe their results.
104
  Language concepts have been a 
research topic at least since Socrates.
105
  Aristotle analyzed language 
forms and the structure of conclusions.
106
  Mathematics has become a 
precise language abstracting science concepts from reality and 
avoiding ambiguities innate to verbal languages.
107
  But, to describe 
science to others, scientists associate their mathematical or logical 
relationships with words.
108
  Also, physicists judge a physicist’s 
understanding by his or her skill in expressing science concepts and 
laws in words.
109
 
These words embody concepts.  Scientists may associate new 
science concepts with old words or create new words to convey the 
concepts.
110
  As Heisenberg explained: 
  Still, in the process of expansion of scientific knowledge the 
language also expands; new terms are introduced and the old ones 
are applied in a wider field or differently from ordinary language. 
Terms such as “energy,” “electricity,” “entropy” are obvious 
examples. In this way we develop a scientific language which may 
 
 103. U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFF., MANUAL OF PATENT 
EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2173.01 (rev. 9, 2012) [hereinafter MPEP] (emphasis added). 
 104. WERNER HEISENBERG, PHYSICS AND PHILOSOPHY 168 (1958); see FEYNMAN, supra  
note 78, at 40-41. 
 105. HEISENBERG, supra note 104, at 169. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at 172. 
 108. Id. at 168; see FEYNMAN, supra note 78, at 40-41. 
 109. HEISENBERG, supra note 104. 
 110. Id. at 173. 
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be called a natural extension of ordinary language adapted to be 
added fields of scientific knowledge.
111
 
 But, these terms of art may easily create ambiguities in 
interpreting the old words with the new concepts.  Also, translating 
the math or logic into a word language, like English, innately 
introduces ambiguities through concepts “lost in translation.”112 
Heisenberg credits words’ poor fit for science with their 
origination in ancient times to communicate and think.
113
  Language 
grew by chance and illogically.
114
  “It is of course a well known fact 
that the words are not so clearly defined as they seem.”115  (This 
“fact” further shows Carnap’s point that scientists talk about universal 
laws as “facts.”)  For instance, “piece of iron” and “piece of wood” 
make sense, but “piece of water” does not.116  And, “red” and “green” 
may mean very different things to different people, for instance, when 
one is colorblind.
117
 
In sum, scientists grope for ways to translate their results into 
words.  They associate existing words with science concepts and 
create a semantic or definitional ambiguity for the word.  They adapt 
the language to try to fit the current science concepts for the current 
expression of laws.  They also invent new words to carry their 
mathematical or logical science concepts.  But, as with any 
translation, the process imperfectly captures, that is digitizes, the 
science concepts in words. 
2. Science Laws 
Words have innate problems expressing science laws.
118  
Like 
Carnap’s scheme of partial interpretations, Heisenberg noted that 
physicists match symbols with observable quantities letting natural 
laws be described in verbal language.
119
  Also, Carnap noted that 
symbolic logic gives precision to science statements, but English 
makes it easy to confuse singular fact statements with universal law 
 
 111. Id. (emphasis added). 
 112. FEYNMAN, supra note 78, at 40; HEISENBERG, supra note 104, at 179. 
 113. HEISENBERG, supra note 104, at 168-69. 
 114. Id. at 168. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. at 169. 
 118. CARNAP, supra note 69 at 4–6; see also HEISENBERG, supra note 104, at 167-86 
(discussing these problems in Chapter 10 “Language and Reality in Modern Physics”). 
 119. See HEISENBERG, supra note 104, at 167-86. 
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statements.
120
  For instance: 
If a zoologist writes in a textbook, “The elephant is an excellent 
swimmer”, he does not mean that a certain elephant, which he 
observed a year ago in a zoo, is an excellent swimmer.  When he 
says “the elephant”, he is saying “the” in the Aristotelian sense; it 
refers to the entire class of elephants.
121
 
Scientists too can fall into the trap of calling universal law 
statements “facts.”  For instance, simple physical “fact” statements 
are really universal laws: “electric currents create heat when flowing 
through conductors;” “electric currents create magnetic fields when 
flowing through conductors;” and “substances expand when 
heated.”122 
D. Human Reliance on Metaphors for Even the Most Complex 
Science Concepts 
1. Metaphors in Language 
Pinker notes that language overflows with metaphors: 
[L]anguage is saturated with implicit metaphors like EVENTS 
ARE OBJECTS and TIME IS SPACE.  Indeed, space turns out to 
be a conceptual vehicle not just for time but for many kinds of 
states and circumstances.  Just as a meeting can be moved from 
3:00 to 4:00, a traffic light can go from green to red, a person can 
go from flipping burgers to running a corporation, and the 
economy can go from bad to worse.  Metaphor is so widespread in 
language that it’s hard to find expressions for abstract ideas that 
are not metaphorical. 
123
 
2. Abstract Ideas as Metaphors 
Humans almost always express abstract ideas as metaphors.
124
  
Science concepts and laws are merely a special case.  Metaphors have 
import by capturing “relations among parts, even if the parts 
themselves are very different.” 125  In fact: 
[M]any scientific theories were first stated as analogies, and often 
are still best explained that way: gravity is like light, heat is like a 
 
 120. CARNAP, supra note 69, at 3-7. 
 121. Id. at 5 (emphasis added). 
 122. Id. at 5-6. 
 123. PINKER, supra note 90, at 6 (emphasis added except for original capitalization). 
 124. Id. at 3, 6. 
 125. Id. at 254. 
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fluid, evolution is selective breeding.  For an analogy to be 
scientifically useful, though, the correspondences can’t apply to a 
part of one thing that merely resembles a part of the other.  They 
have to apply to the relationships, and to the relationships between 
the relationships between the relationships.
126 .
 
As discussed, Heisenberg noted the ability to simply describe 
science in words is deemed to show understanding.
127
  For instance 
Nicolas Carnot analogized heat transfer with water in a waterfall.
128
  
“If one were to draw box-and-arrow diagrams of the two systems 
indicating what depends on what and what causes what, the geometry 
of the two diagrams would be the same; only the labels would be 
different.”129   
To work, science analogies must be disciplined.
130
  Dedre 
Gentner and her collaborator Michaels Jeziorksi point out that this 
mental discipline is essential to the sound use of analogy in science, 
but it didn’t come easy.  Loose metaphors are the hallmarks of 
pseudoscience, quacks, bad science writing, and bad science 
teaching.
131
 
Making science metaphors is part of associating language with 
science.  As Heisenberg noted, scientists match science concepts with 
words. Pinker (and Richard Boyd) likewise notes: 
[M]etaphor is one of many devices available to the scientific 
community to accomplish the task of accommodation of language 
to the causal structure of the world. . . . the task of introducing 
terminology, and modifying usage of existing terminology, so that 
linguistic categories are available which describe the casually and 
explanatorily significant features of the world.
132
 
Metaphor in science, Boyd suggests, is a version of the everyday 
process in which a metaphor is pressed in service to fill gaps in a 
language’s vocabulary, like rabbit ears to refer to the antennas that 
used to sprout from the tops of television sets. . . . The metaphor 
evolves into a technical term for an abstract concept that subsumes 
both the target phenomenon and the source phenomenon.  It’s an 
 
 126. Id. (citing Dedre Gentner and collaborators). 
 127. HEISENBERG, supra note 104, at 168. 
 128. Id. 
 129. PINKER, supra note 90, at 254-55. 
 130. Id. at 255-56. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. at 257 (quoting Richard Boyd, Metaphor and Theory Change: What is a 
“Metaphor” a Metaphor for?, in METAPHOR AND THOUGHT (A. Ortony ed., 2d ed. 1993)) 
(emphasis added). 
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instance of something that every philosopher of science knows 
about scientific language and that most laypeople misunderstand: 
scientists don’t “carefully define their terms” before beginning an 
investigation.  Instead they use words loosely to point to a 
phenomenon in the world, and the meaning of words gradually 
become more precise as the scientists come to understand the 
phenomenon more thoroughly.
133
 
This quote expressly relates science analogies to science 
philosophy.  This giving old terms new meanings, making new terms, 
and analogies harkens to Heisenberg’s thoughts on describing science 
concepts and laws with words.
134
  The quote’s suggestions of “cause,” 
“goal,” and “change” echo world-wide basic language concepts.135 
E. Compulsive Human Abstraction 
1. Stock Human Thoughts 
Human “characterizations of reality” in science laws and patent 
claims, expressed in language, are built from a stock “inventory of 
thoughts.”136  “The inventory begins with some basic units, like 
events, states, things, substances, places, and goals.  It specifies the 
basic ways in which these units can do things: acting, going, 
changing, being, [and] having.”137  Thus, science concepts and the 
science laws including them are built from the stock thought 
inventory. 
Process/method claims include Pinker’s “actions.”  Almost by 
definition, patent processes/methods require gerunds like Pinker’s 
“acting, going, changing.”138  Process/method claim steps involve 
“actions . . . with a goal in mind.”139  Thus, the steps can have “a 
destination of motion . . . or the state resulting from a change.”140 
“Humans have a primitive concept of number, which 
distinguishes only one, two, and many, though they can also estimate 
larger quantities approximately.”141  An old, but true, physics joke 
asserts that physicists only understand one, two, and an infinite 
 
 133. Id. 
 134. HEISENBERG, supra note 104, at 173. 
 135. Id. at 81-82. 
 136. PINKER, supra note 90, at 428. 
 137. Id. 
 138. FABER, supra note 102, § 4:2 (discussing method steps as gerunds). 
 139. PINKER, supra note 90, at 428. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. at 429. 
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number of things.  Physicists thoroughly understand how one body 
moves and two bodies interact.
142
  Statistical mechanics studies very 
large, practically infinite, numbers of bodies, such as molecules and 
atoms in a liquid or solid.
143
  It closely relates to heat through 
molecular motions in solids, liquids, and gases.
144
  But a “closed-
form,” that is exact, solution for three bodies moving under each 
other’s influence has humbled physicists and mathematicians for 
centuries.
145
 
2. Abstracting Objects into Schematic Models 
Pinker also stresses that humans boil down objects into 
schematic models that can be easily spatially manipulated.
146
  In fact, 
patent claim elements make up a claim diagram “stick figure,” or 
schematic, showing how claim elements relate.
147
  The stick figure is 
a standard tool for analyzing, and checking, patent-claim structure.
148
 
3. Patent Claim Elements & Whole Claims as Single 
“Abstract” Ideas 
Humans tend to see entities and ideas as blobs without parts.
149
 
“The entire object is thought to be located in a spot, or to move as a 
whole, or to have a trait that suffuses it, or to change from one state to 
another in its entirety (as a wagon loaded with hay, or a garden 
swarming with bees).”150 
Like everyone else, lawyers, and judges, compulsively think 
holistically.  In fact, virtually the whole legal system worships 
holistic, yes or no, answers: guilty versus not guilty; liable versus not 
liable; infringed versus not infringed; valid versus invalid; grant 
versus deny; affirm versus reverse.  Disputes spanning years and 
thousands of pages resolve into holistic, yes or no, black or white, 
answers.  As every law student knows, cases come to “stand for” a 
particular rule.  That rule, the holding, is normally expressed as a 
simple sentence or two and nicely fits into an outline or hornbook on 
 
 142. See, e.g., HERBERT GOLDSTEIN, CLASSICAL MECHANICS (2d ed. 1980). 
 143. See, e.g., F. REIF, FUNDAMENTALS OF STATISTICAL MECHANICS AND THERMAL 
PHYSICS 47-86 (1965). 
 144. Id. at 87-127. 
 145. E.g., GOLDSTEIN, supra note 142, at 453, 528, 540. 
 146. PINKER, supra note 90, at 430. 
 147. FABER, supra note 102, § 3:22. 
 148. Id. 
 149. PINKER, supra note 90, at 429 
 150. Id. 
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a particular legal field. The rule is later applied in other cases under 
stare decisis.  In a sense, relief has more play; damages can widely 
range along a single dimension, money value, and equitable relief is 
even more open.  Even so, a court will award damages and enjoin acts 
versus no damages and no injunction. 
So, in the context of patent claims, humans tend to think of what 
a patent claim is as a holistic blob (i.e., a single thing) having “a 
trait.”  In other words, humans tend to automatically associate an 
abstract idea with anything, including a patent claim.  Humans 
reduce “Claim 1” to some holistic thing.  As Posner noted, patents 
protect ideas, unlike copyright.
151
 
Thus, when humans, such as patent lawyers and judges, reduce 
“Claim 1” to a holistic idea, that is, a single idea, it becomes quite 
easy to think of “Claim 1” as an “abstract idea.” 
“But humans are also capable of articulating an object into its 
parts and registering how they are related to one another (as in the 
bottom of a wagon or the edge of the garden).”152 Likewise, humans 
can articulate claims as having parts, that is, elements. 
Even so, applying the holistic “blob” precept, humans tend to 
reduce these elements to holistic blobs.  And each claim element is a 
blob making a stick-figure claim schematic.
153
 
For software, Julie Cohen and Mark Lemley noted an overly 
abstract view could yield patent infringement where none should 
exist, like a copyrighted work’s last abstractions yielding unprotected 
(i.e., uncopyrightable) ideas with the abstractions test.
154
 
Perhaps showing these abstraction tendencies, patent claim 
language seems to have remained stable over time and across 
fields.
155
  Despite changes in science and technology, claim length has 
failed to change much over time or between fields.
156
 
F. Words Describe Basic Mechanical Engineering 
Pinker notes that words work quite well to describe basic 
 
 151. Assessment Techs. of Wis., LLC v. WIREdata, Inc., 350 F.3d 640, 647 (7th Cir. 
2003) (Posner, J.). 
 152. PINKER, supra note 90, at 429 
 153. FABER, supra note 102, § 3:22. 
 154. Julie E. Cohen & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Scope and Innovation in the Software 
Industry, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1, 49 & n.210 (2001) (quoting Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 
F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930) (Hand, J.)). 
 155. Kristen Osenga, The Shape of Things to Come: What We Can Learn from Patent 
Claim Language Length, 28 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 617 (2012). 
 156. Id. 
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engineering.
157
  For instance, words can describe a toilet’s basic 
operation very well.
158
  They also describe other basic engineering 
concepts quite well: cooking recipes, first-aid instructions, house-
keeping hints, sewing patterns, home-repair manuals, and sports 
tips.
159
  In essence, all these examples involve basic mechanical 
engineering related to everyday objects.  Under Carnap’s system, any 
science laws involved are “empirical,” dealing with directly 
observable properties rather than “theoretical.”160 
IV. COPYRIGHT LAW’S LINKS TO PATENT LAW 
Copyright law has many links to patent law.  First, Congress gets 
its power to grant copyrights and patents from the same constitutional 
clause.  Second, the Supreme Court has often analogized copyrights 
and patents.  Third, scholars have applied patent law concepts to 
copyright.  Fourth, scholars have compared copyrightability with 
patentability. 
The Constitution’s Intellectual Property (IP) Clause grants 
Congress the “Power . . . [t]o promote the Progress of Science and 
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors 
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”161  
Unlike trademarks, Congress gets its power to grant copyrights and 
patents from the IP Clause.
162
 
Given the IP Clause grant, the Supreme Court has often 
analogized copyrights with patents and vice versa.  For instance, the 
Court stressed its steadfast rejection of an automatic-injunction rule to 
remedy copyright infringement in rejecting an  automatic-injunction 
rule to remedy patent infringement.
163
  Also, by analogy to patent 
law’s non-infringing staple articles defense, the Court ruled the maker 
of a video cassette recorder (VCR)’ not vicariously liable, as the VCR 
 
 157. PINKER, supra note 90, at 226-28. 
 158. Id. at 226-27. 
 159. Id. at 228. 
 160. CARNAP, supra note 69, at 6, 225-28. 
 161. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 162. The Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 93-95 (1879) (Miller, J.).  See generally 
MARSHALL A. LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW § 1.10-13 (5th ed. 2010) 
(comparing patent, copyright, and trademark law); MARY LAFRANCE, UNDERSTANDING 
TRADEMARK LAW, §§ 1.06-1.11 (2d ed. 2009) (comparing trademark law with patent and 
copyright law); JANE C. GINSBURG & ROBERT A. GORMAN, COPYRIGHT LAW 8-11 (2012) 
(comparing copyright law with patent and trademark law). 
 163. See, e.g., eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 392-93 (2006) (quoting 
Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127-28 (1932)). 
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had substantial non-infringing uses.
164
 
Like the Supreme Court, some scholars have tried making 
copyright analysis more precise by applying patent concepts.  Wiley 
rejected copyright’s idea-expression split and abstractions test as 
hopelessly vague and impractical.
165
  Like conditioning an invention’s 
patentability on examination, Wiley proposed making copyright 
conditional and analogized a traditional copyright analysis with patent 
examination.
166
 
Landes and Posner linked copyrightability with patentability.
167
  
They noted both copyright and patent law failed to protect ideas.
168
  
Uncopyrightable ideas are “standard plots, stock characters, verse 
forms, literary and musical genres, schools of painting, dramatic 
conventions, iconography, and the like.”169  Patent-ineligible ideas are 
“fundamental scientific (including mathematical) and technological 
principles.”170  But, Landes and Posner related the unprotectable ideas 
in copyright and patent by “both . . . the enormous potential for rent 
seeking that would be created if property rights could be obtained in 
them and in the enormous transactions costs that would be imposed 
on would-be users.”171  Prometheus quoted the same passage by 
Landes and Posner in stressing that natural laws should fail 
patentability.
172
 
Even so, Judge Posner contrasted copyright and patent ideas.   
A copyright demands only enough originality to distinguish a work 
from like public domain works.
173
  Unlike copyright law, patent law 
requires “substantial originality,” that is, novelty and non-
obviousness, before granting a patent.
174
  He also stressed patents 
grant greater market power as patents protect ideas, while copyrights 
do not.
175
 
 
 164. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 439-42 (1984). 
 165. Wiley, supra note 12, at 121-29. 
 166. Id. at 156-58. 
 167. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 1, at 305-06. 
 168. Id. at 305. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. at 305-06, quoted with approval in Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus 
Labs., Inc.¸132 S. Ct. 1289, 1302 (2012). 
 172. 132 S. Ct. at 1302. 
 173. Assessment Techs. of Wis., LLC v. WIREdata, Inc., 350 F.3d 640, 643 (7th Cir. 
2003) (Posner, J.) (citing Bucklew v. Hawkins, Ash, Baptie & Co., 329 F.3d 923, 929 (7th Cir. 
2003); Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 102-03 (2d Cir. 1951)). 
 174. Id. (citing Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345-48 (1991)). 
 175. Id. at 647. 
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But, despite these differences, patent-ineligible ideas link to 
copyright-ineligible ideas.  In introducing the abstractions test, Judge 
Hand compared copyright-ineligible ideas in Shakespeare’s Twelth 
Night with Einstein’s theory of relativity and Darwin’s The Origin of 
Species.
176
  Seventy-five years later, a prominent 2005 case stressed 
the Abstraction Test’s usefulness for literary works by noting 
relativity could function as a “literary” idea: “two different authors 
each can describe, with very different words, the theory of special 
relativity.  The words will be protected as expression.  The theory is a 
set of unprotected ideas.”177  Thus, copyright-ineligible ideas include 
patent-ineligible ideas. 
Copyright law’s ties to patent law, especially for copyrightability 
and patentability, suggest copyright tests and tools might apply to 
works that are both copyrightable and patentable, as well as patent 
law in general.  Software is both copyrightable and patentable.  The 
abstractions test has been applied to software.  Recently, the 
abstractions test has been applied to patent law. 
A. Getting Intellectual Property (IP) Protection 
Patents are far harder to get than copyrights.  Copyright attaches 
the moment an author fixes a work in a tangible medium.
178
  A 
copyright holder may register the copyrighted work.
179
  Registration, 
but not examination, is required before an infringement lawsuit may 
be initiated.
180
 
In contrast, patents must be examined and issued by the U.S. 
Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) before an inventor gets full 
patent protection.
181
  Even so, a patent’s analog to fixing in a tangible 
medium is conception with “reduction to practice.”182  Before the 
recent America Invents Act (AIA), the United States had a “first-to-
invent” system.183  An inventor got inventive priority for a patent 
application and issued patent from the conception date if the inventor 
diligently worked toward reduction to practice.
184
  Actual reduction to 
 
 176. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 122 (2d Cir. 1930) (Hand, J.). 
 177. Mannion v. Coors Brewing Co., 377 F. Supp. 2d 444, 458 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
 178. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012). 
 179. Id. § 410 
 180. Id. § 411(a). 
 181. 35 U.S.C. §§ 111, 131, 151. 
 182. Id. § 102(g)(2). 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id.; 37 C.F.R. § 1.131(b). 
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practice meant building a working model.
185
  Constructive reduction 
to practice meant filing a patent application meeting the enablement 
and written description requirements.
186
  Now, the AIA has 
established America’s first-to-file system in line with most other 
nations.  New patent applications only get priority through earlier 
patent applications in the U.S. or abroad.
187
 
Due to patent’s formal grant process through the USPTO, patent 
applicants may appeal patent-application rejections directly to district 
court
188
 or the Federal Circuit.
189
  In contrast, copyright validity is 
only judged during an infringement lawsuit.
190
 
B. Eligible Subject Matter 
1. Copyright’s Idea-Expression Split: Ineligible vs. 
Eligible Subject-Matter 
To be copyright eligible, a work must be an “original work of 
authorship.”191  Copyrightable subject matter includes: 1) literary 
works; 2) musical works, along with any accompanying words; 3) 
dramatic works, along with any accompanying music; 4) pantomimes 
and choreographic works; 5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works; 
6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works; 7) sound recordings; 
and 8) architectural works.
192
 
With the positive requirements of originality, authorship, and 
fitting into a class, the Copyright Act also carves out copyright-
ineligible subject matter.  Copyright does not cover “any idea, 
procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, 
or discovery.”193  In essence, the bar against procedures, processes, 
systems, and methods of operation separates copyrights from 
patents.
194
 
 
 185. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.204(2)(ii). 
 186. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(g)(2); 37 C.F.R. § 41.201. 
 187. 35 U.S.C. §§ 119, 120 (2006). 
 188. Id. § 145. 
 189. Id. § 141. 
 190. 17  U.S.C. §§ 102, 408 (2012). 
 191. Id. § 102(a). 
 192. Id. §§ 102(a)(1)-(8). 
 193. Id. § 102(b); see also 37 C.F.R. § 202.1(b) (2012) (discussing “ideas, plans, methods, 
or devices, as distinguished from the particular manner in which they are expressed or described 
in a writing”). 
 194. See Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879) (rejecting copyright eligibility of a book-
keeping system as more suitable for patent). 
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But, the bar against ideas, concepts, principles, and discoveries 
enforces a more basic exclusion from copyright protection.  This 
“idea” bar has led to a long and rich case law weeding copyright-
ineligible parts from copyrightable works.
195
  Though an idea’s 
expression may be copyright eligible, the idea lacks eligibility.
196
  
Copyright calls this split the idea-expression dichotomy.  As the 
regulations note: “Ideas, plans, methods, systems, or devices, as 
distinguished from the particular manner in which they are expressed 
or described in writing” are copyright ineligible.197 
Doctrine has extended copyright ineligible ideas.  First, elements 
necessarily following from copyright ineligible ideas are likewise 
copyright ineligible.
198
  Second, stock story elements, called scenes a 
faire, are copyright ineligible.
199
  Third, merger posits even an idea’s 
expression is copyright ineligible if the idea can only be expressed in 
limited ways.
200
  If so, the idea and expression “merges” to become 
copyright ineligible. 
2. Hand Abstractions Test (Abstractions Test)—
Separating Copyright-Ineligible Ideas from 
Eligible Expression 
a. General Test 
Judge Learned Hand first stated the abstractions test with: 
It is of course essential to any protection of literary property, 
whether at common-law or under the statute, that the right cannot 
be limited literally to the text, else a plagiarist would escape by 
immaterial variations. . . . 
  But when the plagiarist does not take out a block in suit, but an 
abstract of the whole, the decision is more troublesome.  Upon any 
work, and especially upon a play, a great number of patterns of 
increasing generality will fit equally well, as more and more of the 
incident is left out.  The last may perhaps be no more than the most 
 
 195. Id.; see also A. A. Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972 (2d Cir. 
1980) (finding historical facts ineligible).  See generally LEAFFER, supra note 162, § 2.13; 
GINSBURG & GORMAN, supra note 162, at 27-35. 
 196. 37 C.F.R. § 202.1(b). 
 197. Id. (emphasis added). 
 198. See generally GINSBURG & GORMAN, supra note 162, at 30-31; LEAFFER, supra note 
162, § 2.13[B][1]. 
 199. See generally LEAFFER, supra note 162, § 2.13[B][4]. 
 200. See generally GINSBURG & GORMAN, supra note 162, at 30-31; LEAFFER, supra note 
162, § 2.13[B][1]. 
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general statement of what the play is about, and at times might 
consist only of its title; but there is a point in this series of 
abstractions where they are no longer protected, since otherwise 
the playwright could prevent the use of his ‘ideas,’ to which, apart 
from their expression, his property is never extended. . . . In such 
cases we are rather concerned with the line between expression 
and what is expressed.
201
 
In sum, the abstractions test guides both infringement and 
copyrightability.  First, to test copyrightability, the abstractions test 
tries to abstract ideas from the “expression” embodied in the full 
copyrighted work.  If the expression is merely an idea, the work is 
uncopyrightable.  If not, the work is copyrightable and “cannot be 
limited literally to the text.” 
Second, to test infringement, one can compare the abstraction 
against an accused work.  After a series of abstractions, the test 
potentially reaches uncopyrightable ideas of “what is expressed” in 
the copyrighted work which can no longer be infringed.  A few years 
later, Judge Hand stressed that a play may be pirated without the 
dialogue as a play included “words and gestures and scenery and 
costume and . . . looks of the actors themselves. . . . No plagiarist can 
excuse the wrong by showing how much of his work he did not 
pirate.”202  Succinctly, “[a] copyright never extends to the ‘idea’ of 
the ‘work,’ but only to its ‘expression,’ and that no one infringes, 
unless he descends so far into what is concrete as to invade that 
‘expression.’”203  But, shortly before his death, Judge Hand admitted: 
“Obviously, no principle can be stated as to when an imitator has 
gone beyond copying the ‘idea,’ and has borrowed its ‘expression.’ 
Decisions must therefore inevitably be ad hoc.”204 
Thus, the accused work need not be identical to a copyrighted 
work to infringe it.  An abstraction of the accused work may match 
the copyrighted work or vice versa.  But Judge Hand saw the decision 
between idea and expression as inevitably vague and arbitrary. 
 
 201. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930) (emphasis 
added) (citing Holmes v. Hurst, 174 U.S. 82, 86 (1899); Guthrie v. Curlett, 36 F.2d 694 (2d Cir. 
1929)).  See generally STEPHEN M. MCJOHN, COPYRIGHT 97-101 (2d ed. 2009). 
 202. Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 55-56 (2d Cir. 1936), aff’d, 
309 U.S. 490 (1940). 
 203. Nat’l Comics Publ’ns v. Fawcett Publ’ns, 198 F.2d 927 (2d Cir. 1952) (Hand, J.) 
(emphasis added). 
 204. Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960) 
(Hand, J.). 
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b. Non-Verbal Works 
A few years ago, an influential district-court opinion weighed 
applying the abstractions test to photographs.
205
  It concluded that the 
idea-expression split breaks down for non-textual, that is, visual, 
works.
206
  Quoting Peter Pan, the court noted “[i]n the case of 
designs, which are addressed to the aesthetic sensibilities of the 
observer, the test is, if possible, even more intangible.”207  It also 
quoted and adopted views from Judge Jon O. Newman’s paper: 
[W]hether courts should be making those determinations with the 
same modes of analysis and even the same vocabulary that was 
appropriate for writings. . . . [I]t is not just a matter of vocabulary. 
Words convey concepts, and if we use identical phrases from one 
context to resolve issues in another, we risk failing to notice that 
the relevant concepts are and ought to be somewhat different.
208
 
The court noted Judge Jon Newman had opined one cannot 
divide a visual work into neat abstraction layers in precisely the same 
way as text.
209
  I will return to this view later in applying the 
abstractions test to patents, as patent claims deal with visual concepts. 
3. Eligible vs. Ineligible Subject Matter for Utility 
Patents—Abstract vs. Inventive Ideas 
To be eligible for a utility patent, an entity must “invent[] or 
discover[] any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or 
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement 
thereof.”210  Paraphrasing, an inventor must “invent or discover” 
something “new and useful” to get a patent.211  Also, the patentable 
invention or discovery must be in one of the four classes: 1) 
process/method; 2) machine, 3) manufacture/article, or 4) 
composition of matter.
212
 
By positively requiring invention or discovery of something 
 
 205. Mannion v. Coors Brewing Co., 377 F. Supp. 2d 444, 455-61 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) 
(quoting Peter Pan Fabrics, 274 F.2d at 489; Hon. Jon O. Newman, New Lyrics for an Old 
Melody: The Idea/Expression Dichotomy in the Computer Age, 17 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 
691, 697 (1999); Warner Bros. v. ABC, 720 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1983) (Newman, J.); Franklin 
Mint Corp. v. Nat’l Wildlife Art Exch., Inc., 575 F.2d 62, 65 (3d Cir. 1978)). 
 206. Id. at 458-61. 
 207. Id. at 459 (quoting Peter Pan Fabrics, 274 F.2d at 489). 
 208. Id. (quoting Newman, supra note 205, at 697). 
 209. Id. (quoting Newman, supra note 205, at 698). 
 210. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). 
 211. Id. 
 212. Id. 
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“new and useful” that fits into one of the four classes, the Patent Act 
fails to specifically carve out basic subject matter ineligible for a 
utility patent.  But, the Patent Act substantively limits inventions to 
novel and non-obvious inventions or discoveries.
213
 
Even so, courts have developed patent-ineligible classes. Patent-
ineligible subjects include: mathematical formulas;
214
 products of 
nature and natural phenomena;
215
 abstract ideas; and natural laws.
216
 
4. Copyright Law’s Idea–Expression Split Versus Patent 
Law’s Natural Law–Invention Split 
Landes and Posner compared and contrasted copyright law’s 
idea-expression split with patent law’s natural law-invention split.217  
Ideas cannot be copyrighted, but their expression may be 
copyrighted.
218
  Likewise, natural laws cannot be patented.
219
  But, 
unlike copyright, “ideas” can be patented.220  In court opinions, 
Posner further compared patents and copyrights: 
Copyright law unlike patent law does not require substantial 
originality.  In fact, it requires only enough originality to enable a 
work to be distinguished from similar works that are in the public 
domain, since without some discernible distinction it would be 
impossible to determine whether a subsequent work was copying a 
copyrighted work or a public-domain work.
221
 
 
 213. Id. §§ 102, 103. 
 214. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978). 
 215. Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127 (1948). 
 216. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 187 (1981). 
 217. See generally GINSBURG & GORMAN, supra note 162, at 27-32, 137-40. 
 218. Id. (quoting Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879); H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 57 
(1976); Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49 (2d Cir. 1936) (Hand, J.), aff’d, 
309 U.S. 390 (1940)); Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930) (Hand, 
J.); Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487 (2d Cir. 1960) (Hand, J.); 
Mannion v. Coors Brewing Co., 377 F. Supp. 2d 444 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); MARSHALL A. LEAFFER, 
UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW § 2.13, 78-92 (5th ed. 2010). 
 219. But see Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 91 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1951) 
(Frank, J.) (distinguishing copyright’s originality from patent’s inventorship); Mazer v. Stein, 
204 F.2d 472, 474 (4th Cir. 1953) (distinguishing copyrighted works from design patents), aff’d, 
347 U.S. 201 (1954). 
 220. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954). 
 221. Assessment Techs. of Wis., LLC v. WIREdata, Inc., 350 F.3d 640, 643, 647 (7th Cir. 
2003) (Posner, J.) (citing Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345-48 
(1991); Bucklew v. Hawkins, Ash, Baptie & Co., 329 F.3d 923, 929 (7th Cir. 2003) (Posner, J.); 
Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 102-03 (2d Cir. 1951)); see also 
ConFold Pac., Inc. v. Polaris Indus., Inc., 433 F.3d 952, 958-59 (7th Cir. 2006) (Posner, J.) 
(comparing trade secrets, patents, and copyrights). 
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The following table sums-up the main correspondences between 
copyright law and patent law: 
Table 1. 
 
COPYRIGHT PATENT 
Copyrightability Validity including Eligibility 
Idea 
Abstract Idea, Natural Law, or 
Natural Phenomenon 
Expression 
Invention = Described & Enabled 
(§ 112), Novel (§ 102) & 
Nonobvious (§ 103) 
Fixation 
Conception and/or Reduction to 
Practice 
C. Abstractions Test for Software 
Abstractions test is a standard copyright tool for filtering out 
uncopyrightable elements from a copyrighted work.  With the 1980’s 
technology boom, software writers tried to, and did, copyright 
software.
222
  Thus, courts and authors naturally recognized the 
abstractions test might apply to software.
223
 
As software patent protection rose, authors weighed applying the 
abstractions test to software patents.  In 1995, Peterson briefly noted 
courts applied something like the abstractions test to determine the 
patentability of computer-implemented inventions’.224  He deemed the 
abstractions ran from an invention’s “embodiment . . . with purely 
‘physical steps’ (i.e. a machine)” to “an embodiment of the invention 
as an intangible program or ‘algorithm.’”225  Though Peterson thought 
 
 222. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1248 (3d. Cir. 
1983).  See generally LAEFFER, supra note 162, §§ 6.04-6.06[E]-[F]; GINSBURG & GORMAN, 
supra note 162, at 25-26, 33. 
 223. Computer Assocs. Int’l v. Altai, Inc., 98 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992); Susan L. Mashour, 
Note, Proposed Judicial Guidelines for Deciding Software Infringement Actions, 32 WAYNE L. 
REV. 1191, 1199-2000 (1986).  See generally LAEFFER, supra note 162, §§ 9.04[E]-[F]; 
GINSBURG & GORMAN, supra note 162, at 139.  But see George N. Grammas, Note, The Test for 
Proving Copyright Infringement of Computer Software: ‘Structure, Sequence, And 
Organization’ And ‘Look And Feel’ Cases, 14 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 105 (1988) (reviewing 
other software copyright infringement tests). 
 224. Peterson, supra note 3, at 120-26 & nn. 258-68, 283 (1995) (discussing Diamond v. 
Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 
U.S. 63 (1972); In re Allapat, 33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc)). 
 225. Id. at 123. 
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the abstractions test could be applied to other invention types, he saw 
computer-implemented inventions as the clearest abstractions test 
application.
226
  Even so, he rejected a patent law abstractions test as 
doomed to fail and, thus, forcing judges to rely on public policy.
227
  
Julie E. Cohen and Mark A. Lemley noted an overly abstract view of 
software could yield patent infringement where none should exist, 
like a copyrighted work’s last abstractions yielding unprotected ideas 
with the abstractions test.
228
 
V. A DOWNWARD ABSTRACTIONS TEST FOR UTILITY-PATENT 
ELIGIBILITY 
In July 2012, the Federal Circuit echoed Judge Hand’s Peter Pan 
decision “‘abstract ideas’ test” for unpatentable subjects under 
Section 101.  As noted, Peter Pan deemed the line between idea and 
expression as necessarily vague and ad hoc.
229
  Likewise, the July 
2012 Federal Circuit panel suggested a similar problem in testing for 
abstract ideas in patents.
230
 
A. Patent Claims’ Manifest Innate Vertical Abstractions Ladder 
Patent law is innately complex because patent claims must try to 
capture science and technical concepts with words.
231
  Thus, patent 
law has an innate abstractions problem. 
The copyright abstractions test requires abstracting a copyrighted 
work.  The work lacks an innate abstraction structure, so a fact-finder 
must make an abstraction from scratch. 
But, patent claim drafting’s whole point is to abstract an 
invention’s key patentable concepts.  The specification includes the 
original claims.
232
  But the specification must enable the claims.
233
  
 
 226. Id. at n.282. 
 227. Id. at 123, 132. 
 228. Cohen & Lemley, supra note 154, at 49 & n.210 (quoting Nichols v. Universal 
Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930) (Hand, J.)). 
 229. Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960) 
(Hand, J.). 
 230. CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp., 103 U.S.P.Q.2d 1297, 1303-04 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (Linn, 
J.) (quoting inter alia Donald S. Chisum, Weeds and Seeds in the Supreme Court’s Business 
Methods Patent Decision: New Directions for Regulating Patent Scope, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. 
REV. 11, 14 (2011); Mark A. Lemley et al., Life After Bilski, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1315, 1316 
(2011)). 
 231. See, e.g., FABER, supra note 102. 
 232. 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) (2006). 
 233. Id. § 112(a). 
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This symbiotic structure means each claim has some innate self-
enablement and can help enable other claims. 
Independent claims capture the broadest patentable concepts.
234
  
Thus, they abstract the specification’s inventive concepts.  In turn, 
dependent claims depend on the broadest claims and vary in scope to 
reach narrower concepts.
235
  Even so, the dependent claims abstract 
concepts in the patent. 
Thus, unlike a copyrighted work, a patent’s claim structure 
manifests an innate abstraction ladder.  So, there is no need to split a 
patent into two inventions matched with the specification and claims 
to get an abstraction ladder as Chiang did.
236
 
Further abstracting or “boiling down” the claims will only lead 
to more abstract ideas than they really contain and improperly,  
misleadingly, ascribe these more abstract ideas to the claims.  As the 
Second Circuit noted: “Unlike the subject matter of a patent, 
copyrighted material need be not new, but only original.”237  Thus, the 
Hand abstractions test for patent-eligibility would test for new ideas in 
claims.  But, “new ideas” include tests for Sections 102 and 103, 
along with Section 101. 
B. Young’s Horizontal Abstractions—Over-Abstraction 
Confusion 
Young has proposed building an abstraction for each claim at 
each level.
238
  I term this a “horizontal abstraction” for each claim in 
the innate vertical abstraction claim structure. 
Young gives a few examples.  For instance, he gives an “object” 
(i.e., article of manufacture) abstraction ladder for a soccer ball: A) a 
sphere—mathematical equation for all balls; B) a ball having a 
spherical wall—covering any physical ball; C) a multi-panel soccer 
ball—covering all soccer balls; and D) a soccer ball having a valve 
for receiving an inflation needle.
239
  In essence, this series abstracts 
the soccer ball claim (D). 
But, this approach confuses the issue.  The soccer ball claim (D) 
fails to claim the sphere (A), the ball having a spherical wall (B), and 
the multi-panel soccer ball (C).  Even so, Section 101 subject matter 
 
 234. FABER, supra note 102, § 2:10. 
 235. Id. 
 236. Chiang, Levels of Abstraction, supra note 6, at 1101, 1118-22. 
 237. Ricker v. Gen. Elec. Co., 162 F.2d 141, 142 (2d Cir. 1947) (Clark, J.). 
 238. Young, supra note 11. 
 239. Id. 
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eligibility should not bar any of the “abstractions” except the 
mathematical equation, or abstract idea, of a sphere. 
This horizontal abstraction approach to sifting abstract ideas 
from claim ideas is really an artifact of trying to sift ideas from 
expression in a copyrighted work.  Though copyright fails to protect 
ideas, patents manifestly protect ideas.
240
 
More to the point would be a method to tell whether the abstract 
idea, mathematical formula, or natural law is actually all the claim 
contains. 
C. Abstractions Test in Context—Patent Merger Tests for 
Ineligible Subject Matter 
As noted, copyright’s abstractions test sits within a general idea-
expression structure.  Merger bars copyright by combining ideas with 
their limited expression; an idea than can only be expressed in a few 
ways bars copyrighting the idea’s expression.241  Thus, by flipping the 
abstractions test to move down the abstractions ladder, merger looks 
for the ways an idea can be expressed.  If an idea can only be 
expressed in a few ways, the work only expresses that idea and lacks 
copyright eligibility. 
For patent law, merger should bar patenting the abstract idea.  
Rather than moving up abstractions ladder to test patent-eligibility, 
merger moves down the abstractions ladder from the abstract idea.  
Unlike copyright’s ineligible ideas, patent’s ineligible abstract ideas 
may be expressed in many ways.  Returning to Young’s simple 
example, the abstract idea is the sphere.  In words, a “sphere” shape 
can be expressed as: ball; globe; round solid figure; bubble; or orb.  
All these terms express the abstract “sphere” shape idea and would be 
patent ineligible if the sole term in a claim.  Words have innate 
problems expressing science laws.
242
 
Though Young did not write it, the express mathematical 
formula for a sphere is x
2
 + y
2
 + z
2
 = R
2
.  In essence, Young assumed 
(correctly) that the abstract “sphere” idea and its mathematical 
formula expressed the same abstract idea.  But, as may be obvious, 
not all abstract ideas reduce to formulas, and not all mathematical 
formulas have such simple word descriptions. 
 
 240. See, e.g., Confold Pac., Inc. v. Polaris Indus., Inc., 433 F.3d 952, 958-59 (7th Cir. 
2006) (Posner, J.). 
 241. See generally GINSBURG & GORMAN, supra note 162, at 30-31; LEAFFER, supra note 
162, § 2.13[B][1]. 
 242. See generally GINSBURG & GORMAN, supra note 162, at 4-6. 
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D. Visual Claim Concepts & Mannion’s Copyright Critique 
Following Mannion v. Coors Brewing Co., patent claims might 
fall into “literary” and “visual” types.243  As “literary works,” patent 
claims could be compared against word forms of natural laws or 
abstract ideas. 
The science and technical concepts in claims often involve visual 
descriptions.  For instance, patent claims describe: structure, 
mounting methods, fasteners, bearings, springs, numbers, relative 
placement, voids, shapes, material and optical properties, fluid flow, 
position, materials, electrical properties, transforming rotation to 
translation, transferring translation to translation, sequences, 
movement, and transforming rotation to rotation.
244
  In fact, many 
claim terms fit into these types.
245
 
Thus, the Mannion literary-visual split can likely be ignored in 
patent law.  Despite expressing non-verbal concepts, patent claim 
structure naturally abstracts concepts. 
E. Abstractions Test Like Standard Patent Infringement 
Analysis 
Patent claims are text.  In essence, patent infringement analysis 
tests whether a claim’s wording reads on the accused product and 
process.  This amounts to comparing a patent’s abstract description, 
the claims, against the accused product or process.
246
  In essence, this 
process compares an abstraction of the invention against an 
abstraction of the accused product or process. 
F. Down the Abstractions Ladder to Counteract Compulsions 
& Test’s Bias 
As noted, humans have an innate bias to abstraction.
247
  First, 
humans compulsively metaphorize almost everything, even extremely 
sophisticated science concepts.  Second, humans further compulsively 
abstract the real world by lumping objects and concepts into blobs.  
This familiar “my eyes glaze over” thinking is well-known to 
scientists and engineers who talk to people lacking a technical 
background.  And, as noted, scientists, engineers, lawyers, and judges 
 
 243. Mannion v. Coors Brewing Co., 377 F. Supp. 2d 444, 455-61 ( S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
 244. FABER, supra note 102, app. B, at 5-8. 
 245. Id. (listing claim terms under these types). 
 246. Zenith Labs, Inc. v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 19 F.3d 1418, 1423 (Fed. Cir. 1994) 
(citing Martin v. Barber, 755 F.2d 1564, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1985)). 
 247. See discussion supra Part III.D-E. 
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are not immune from this bias.  In essence, these abstraction biases 
abstract up the abstraction ladder. 
To counteract these innate human compulsions, moving 
downward in abstractions from an alleged science concept or science 
law in the claims puts human reason to work against instinctual 
biases. 
Also, as noted, the abstractions test has a well-known over-
abstraction problem in copyright.
248
  As patent claims have a manifest 
abstraction ladder, one need not further abstract the claims.  The 
whole point of patent claims is to abstract patentable ideas from an 
invention.  Given the over-abstraction bias from abstracting up from 
allegedly copyrightable, or copyright-infringing, works in copyright, 
further abstracting patent claims is unwise and risks retracing 
copyright’s hard lessons with the abstractions test in patent law. 
G. Automatic Adaptation to New Science Expressions 
As noted, the whole point of science is to find new science law 
expressions.  In fact, human science expressions, in logic, math, and 
language, continually change with periodic revolutionary shifts.  The 
abstractions test for patent-eligibility has no ties to any particular 
human science concept or science law expression.  Thus, the 
abstractions test for patent-eligibility can evolve as science evolves. 
VI. PATENT-INELIGIBLE ABSTRACT IDEAS, NATURAL LAWS, & 
NATURAL PHENOMENA 
To complete the downward abstractions test for patent-
eligibility, we must know where to start.  What is the abstract idea, 
natural law, or natural phenomenon at the top? 
Generally, “abstract ideas” (i.e., science concepts) and “laws of 
nature” (i.e., science laws), relevant to the top abstraction level will 
vary by invention class.  For instance, method claims will normally be 
compared against science laws, that is, universal or statistical 
statements, because methods include steps or acts, such as gerunds. 
A. Abstract Science Ideas are Science Concepts: Classificatory, 
Comparative, & Quantitative 
Rudolf Carnap placed science concepts into three groups: 
classificatory, comparative, and quantitative.
249
  Classificatory 
 
 248. Cohen & Lemley, supra note 154, at 49 & n.210. 
 249. CARNAP, supra note 69, at 51-54. 
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concepts place objects in classes with more information required for 
placing objects in narrow classes.
250
  For instance, biologists apply 
classificatory concepts to place plants and animals in species, 
families, and genera.
251
  Describing something as a living organism 
places it in a class.
252
  Further describing it as an animal, a narrower 
class, requires more information.
253
  Labeling it a mammal needs still 
more information.
254
 
Comparative concepts tell how an object relates to another 
object.
255
  For instance, a psychologist may rate a job applicant as 
more or less imaginative than another applicant.
256
  Also, a balancing 
scale can determine the heavier of two objects.
257
  Comparative 
concepts are intermediate between classificatory and quantitative 
concepts.
258
  For instance, labeling an object as warm or cool places it 
in either the warm class or the cool class.
259
  But, the comparative 
concepts warmer and cooler tell how the object relates to another 
object.
260
 
Quantitative concepts involve numbers and measurement.
261
  
Each quantitative concept corresponds to a comparative concept 
pair.
262
  For instance, temperature can be measured in degrees.  In 
turn, temperature corresponds to the comparative concepts of warmer 
and cooler, or hotter and colder.
263
  Many measurement schemes 
require multiple magnitudes.  For instance, unlike temperature, 
measuring physical size requires values for length, width, and height. 
B. Natural Laws: Science Laws Built on Science Concepts 
Science continually struggles with innate problems dividing the 
abstract from the concrete.
264
  Sciences laws sum up observed 
 
 250. Id. at 51, 53. 
 251. Id. at 51. 
 252. Id. 
 253. Id. 
 254. Id. 
 255. CARNAP, supra, note 69, at 51-58. 
 256. Id. at 52. 
 257. Id. at 53-58. 
 258. Id. at 51-52. 
 259. Id. at 52. 
 260. Id. at 53. 
 261. CARNAP, supra, note 69, at 58-114. 
 262. Id. at 58. 
 263. Id. at 51, 103. 
 264. Id. at 102-03. 
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regularities from multiple events.
265
  They “are nothing more than 
statements expressing these regularities as precisely as possible.”266 
Science laws fall into two types: universal and statistical.
267
 
Universal laws state absolute relations while statistical laws state a 
quantitative relationship between items.
268
  For instance, following 
Carnap, the statement, “All ice is cold,” is a universal law while the 
statement, “About half the children born each year are boys,” is a 
statistical law.
269
  Equations are special cases of universal and 
statistical science laws. 
Though not as important here, Carnap further classified laws as 
empirical and theoretical.
270
  Empirical laws deal with directly 
observable or easily measurable properties; they tend to involve 
macroscopic events.
271
 
Empirical laws may be qualitative or quantitative.
272
  For 
instance, “all ravens are black” is a qualitative empirical law 
describing ravens as having the quality “black.”273  Likewise, a 
quantitative empirical law generalizes relationships between 
quantities obtained from simple measurements.
274
  For instance, the 
universal gas laws and Ohm’s law relating voltage to current and 
resistance are empirical quantitative laws.
275 
Unlike empirical laws, theoretical laws deal with concepts not so 
readily observable, such as microscopic events and elementary 
particles.
276
  The laws are “theoretical” only in that they relate to 
different types of concepts and observables, not that the laws lack 
confirmation.
277
 
Science laws often relate causes and effects.  Machines often 
involve cooperating parts.
278
  As method claims state steps or acts, 
often gerunds, method claims are more easily compared with science 
 
 265. Id. at 3 
 266. Id. 
 267. CARNAP, supra note 69, at 3. 
 268. Id. at 6. 
 269. Id. at 3-4. 
 270. Id. at 226-29, 240-46. 
 271. Id. at 6, 225-28. 
 272. Id. at 58-59, 226-27. 
 273. CARNAP, supra note 69, at 5-6, 227. 
 274. Id. at 226-27. 
 275. Id. at 227. 
 276. Id. at 6, 227-29. 
 277. Id. at 227-29, 240-46. 
 278. See FABER, supra note 102, § 5:1. 
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laws than machines. 
Given the machine-method split, different science concepts and 
science laws may sit atop the abstraction ladder for machines versus 
methods. 
C. Patent-Ineligible Abstract Ideas & Natural Laws 
An invention is a patent-ineligible abstract idea or natural law 
when it is a science concept, science law, or equation expressed in 
words as implied by adding trivial features to the alleged science 
concept, science law, or equation to reach the patent claim. 
D. Manufactured Articles & Matter Compositions—Natural 
Objects & Phenomena, Math Relations 
 Articles of manufacture are objects.
279
  But, perhaps showing an 
abstraction bias, practitioners rarely separate “manufactures” from 
“machines.”280 
Science concepts and science laws do not sit atop the ladder for 
articles of manufacture.  Science concepts classify, compare, or 
quantify phenomena.
281
  How concepts classifying, comparing, or 
quantifying phenomena can be articles of manufacture is unclear.  
Further, science laws make general absolute or statistical statements 
about phenomena.
282
  Again, it is tough to conceive of how a science 
law relates to an article. 
 But, a natural object, or natural phenomenon, or math 
relationship may sit atop an article abstraction ladder.  Articles of 
manufacture are objects without moving parts.
283
  Rocks, slabs, and 
maybe dirt, are natural objects.  Likewise, an object might be 
describable by a math formula.  For instance, circles and spheres are 
describable by an equation.
284
  Further, naturally occurring bacteria 
and viruses can sit atop an abstraction ladder to try to reach 
genetically engineered organisms. 
E. Computers 
Though not expressly included in my downward abstraction 
scheme, “computers” share some general features. They are not 
 
 279. FABER, supra note 102, § 5:1. 
 280. Compare id., with 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). 
 281. CARNAP, supra note 69, at 51-54. 
 282. Id. at 3. 
 283. FABER, supra note 102, § 5.1. 
 284. E.g., Young, supra note 11. 
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science concepts, nor are they science laws made of science concepts.  
They are also not natural phenomena, like rain, or natural objects, like 
rocks or the sun.  They are concrete things with interrelated parts. 
Justice Stevens suggests that tying business methods to machines 
makes the methods patent-eligible.
285
  And, as in Diehr,
286
 a computer 
achieving results unattainable by persons might make an invention 
eligible. 
Regardless, the true test of patent-eligibility is whether a 
particular claim with a computer can be reached by a trivial 
downward abstraction from an alleged science concept, science law, 
or natural phenomenon/object.  These distinctions will become clearer 
below in analyzing the claims in CLS Bank v. Alice Corp. 
VII. THE DOWNWARD PATENT-ELIGIBILITY ABSTRACTIONS TEST 
APPLIED TO CLS BANK V. ALICE CORP. 
I will now show how to apply the downward patent-eligibility 
abstractions test with a real-world problem—the claims in CLS Bank 
v. Alice Corporation. Part of the current controversy comes from 
“boiling down” claims before analysis, so I state the claims verbatim 
before applying the test. 
A. Claims at Issue 
Alice’s panel brief quoted five independent claims.287 In my 
approach, the independent claims are the most abstract in the innate 
vertical abstractions ladders for the patents. 
1. Apparatus/System Claims 
a. U.S. Patent No. 7,725,375’s Claim 14 
14. A data processing system to enable the exchange of an 
obligation between parties, the system comprising: 
a communications controller, 
a data storage unit having stored therein 
(a) information about a first account for a first party, independent 
from a second account maintained by a first exchange institution, 
and 
 
 285. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 286. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 187 (1981). 
 287. Brief for Appellant at 9-16, CSK Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp., 717 F.3d 1269 (Fed. Cir. 
2013). 
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(b) information about a third account for a second party, 
independent from a fourth account maintained by a second 
exchange institution; and 
a computer, coupled to said data storage unit and said 
communications controller, that is configured to 
(a) receive a transaction from said first party via said 
communications controller; 
(b) electronically adjust said first account and said third account in 
order to effect an exchange obligation arising from said transaction 
between said first party and said second party after ensuring that 
said first party and/or said second party have adequate value in 
said first account and/or said third account, respectively; and 
(c) generate an instruction to said first exchange institution and/or 
said second exchange institution to adjust said second account 
and/or said fourth account in accordance with the adjustment of 
said first account and/or said third account, wherein said 
instruction being an irrevocable, time invariant obligation placed 
on said first exchange institution and/or said second exchange 
institution.
288
 
The claim-14 set is shallow; nine of the eleven dependent 
claims 15–25 directly depend on claim 14.289 
b. U.S. Patent No. 7,149,720’s Claim 68—’375 
Patent’s Claim 14 Without the Controller 
68. A data processing system to enable the exchange of an 
obligation between parties, the system comprising: 
a data storage unit having stored therein 
(a) information about a first account for a first party, independent 
from a second account maintained by a first exchange institution, 
(b) information about a third account for a second party, 
independent from a fourth account maintained by a-second 
exchange institution; and 
a computer, coupled to said data storage unit, that is configured to 
(a) receive a transaction; 
(b) electronically adjust said first account and said third account in 
order to effect an exchange obligation arising from said transaction 
between said first party and said second party after ensuring that 
 
 288. U.S. Patent No. 7,725,375 col. 66 ll. 1-30 (filed Jun. 27, 2005) (issued May 25, 2010) 
(emphasis added). 
 289. Id. at col. 66 ll. 31-62. 
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said first party and/or said second party have adequate value in 
said first account and/or said third account, respectively; and(c) 
generate an instruction to said first exchange institution and/or said 
second exchange institution to adjust said second account and/or 
said fourth account in accordance with the adjustment of said first 
account and/or said third account, wherein said instruction being 
an irrevocable, time invariant obligation placed on said first 
exchange institution and/or said second exchange institution.
290
 
Claim 68 seems identical to claim 14 except it lacks a controller, 
italicized  in claim 14. Like the claim 14 set, the claim-68 set is 
shallow; nine of the eleven claims, 69-79, depend directly on claim 
68.
291
  In fact, claims 69-79 look identical to claims 15-25. 
2. ‘375 Patent’s Apparatus/Product Claim 39 
39. A computer program product comprising 
a computer readable storage medium having computer readable 
program code embodied in the medium for use by a party to 
exchange an obligation between a first party and a second party, 
the computer program product comprising: 
program code for causing a computer to send a transaction from 
said first party relating to an exchange obligation arising from a 
currency exchange transaction between said first party and said 
second party; and 
program code for causing a computer to allow viewing of 
information relating to processing, by a supervisory institution, of 
said exchange obligation, wherein said processing includes 
(1) maintaining information about a first account for the first party, 
independent from a second account maintained by a first exchange 
institution, and information about a third account for the second 
party, independent from a fourth account maintained by a second 
exchange institution; 
(2) electronically adjusting said first account and said third 
account, in order to effect an exchange obligation arising from said 
transaction between said first party and said second party, after 
ensuring that said first party and/or said second party have 
adequate value in said first account and/or said third account, 
respectively; and 
(3) generating an instruction to said first exchange institution 
 
 290. U.S. Patent No. 7,149,720 col. 69 ll. 20-42 (filed Dec. 31, 2002) (issued Dec. 12, 
2006). 
 291. Id. at col. 69 l. 43-col. 70 l. 21. 
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and/or said second exchange institution to adjust said second 
account and/or said fourth account in accordance with the 
adjustment of said first account and/or said third account, wherein 
said instruction being an irrevocable, time invariant obligation 
placed on said first exchange institution and/or said second 
exchange institution.
292
 
Claim 39 only has two dependent claims, claims 40-41.
293
  Both 
depend directly on claim 39.
294
 
3. Method Claims 
a. U.S. Patent No. 6,912,510’s Claim 68 
68. A method of exchanging an obligation between parties, 
wherein an exchange obligation is administered by a supervisory 
institution, the method performed by the supervisory institution, 
comprising: 
maintaining a first account for a first party, independent from a 
second account maintained by a first exchange institution; 
maintaining a third account for a second party, independent from a 
fourth account maintained by a second exchange institution; 
electronically adjusting said first account and said third account in 
order to effect the exchange obligation between said first party and 
said second party after ensuring that said first party and said 
second party have adequate value in said first account and said 
third account, respectively; and 
providing an instruction to said first exchange institution and said 
second exchange institution to adjust said second account and said 
fourth account in accordance with the adjustment of said first 
account and said third account, wherein said instruction being an 
irrevocable, time invariant obligation placed on said first exchange 
institution and said second exchange institution.
295
 
The claim 68 set is shallow; six of the seven dependent claims 
69-75 directly depend on claim 68.
296
 
 
 
 292. ‘375 Patent col. 68 ll. 5-35. 
 293. Id. at col. 68 ll. 36-41. 
 294. Id. 
 295. U.S. Patent No. 6,912,510 col. 67 l. 38-col. 68 l. 21 (filed May 9, 2000) (issued Jun. 
28, 2005). 
 296. Id. at col. 68 ll. 22-39. 
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b. U.S. Patent No. 5,970,479’s Claim 33 
33. A method of exchanging obligations as between parties, each 
party holding a credit record and a debit record with an exchange 
institution, the credit records and debit records for exchange of 
predetermined obligations, the method comprising the steps of: 
(a) creating a shadow credit record and a shadow debit record for 
each stakeholder party to be held independently by a supervisory 
institution from the exchange institutions; 
(b) obtaining from each exchange institution a start-of-day balance 
for each shadow credit record and shadow debit record; 
(c) for every transaction resulting in an exchange obligation, the 
supervisory institution adjusting each respective party’s shadow 
credit record or shadow debit record, allowing only these 
transactions that do not result in the value of the shadow debit 
record being less than the value of the shadow credit record at any 
time, each said adjustment taking place in chronological order; and 
(d) at the end-of-day, the supervisory institution instructing ones of 
the exchange institutions to exchange credits or debits to the credit 
record and debit record of the respective parties in accordance with 
the adjustments of the said permitted transactions, the credits and 
debits being irrevocable, time invariant obligations placed on the 
exchange institutions.
297
 
Only claim 34 depends on claim 33.
298
 
B. District Court’s “Abstract Idea” 
1. Not a Science Concept 
As discussed, science concepts are classificatory, comparative, 
or quantitative.  They put objects into classes (e.g., hot or cold), 
compare them (e.g., hotter or colder), or express a comparison as a 
quantity (e.g., temperature in degrees). 
The district court rejected the claims as merely expressing the 
abstract idea: 
[T]he Court agrees that the methods are of employing a neutral 
intermediary to ensure that parties to an exchange can honor a 
proposed transaction, to consummate the exchange simultaneously 
to minimize the risk that one party does not gain the fruits of the 
exchange, and then irrevocably to direct the parties, or their value 
holders, to adjust their accounts or records to reflect the concluded 
 
 297. U.S. Patent 5,970,479 col. 65 ll. 23-50 (filed May 28, 1993) (issued Oct. 19, 1999). 
 298. Id. at col. 65 ll. 51-54. 
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transaction.
299
 
This “abstract idea” is hard to understand.  Its complexity makes 
it almost incoherent and may make it seem more “abstract” than it 
really is.  Luckily, the district court explained it: 
This is a basic business or financial concept much like those struck 
down in Bilski II or Ultramercial.  At the heart of these claims is 
the fundamental idea of employing a neutral intermediary to ensure 
that parties to an exchange can honor a proposed transaction, to 
consummate the exchange simultaneously to minimize the risk that 
one party does not gain the fruits of the exchange, and then 
irrevocably to direct the parties, or their value holders, to adjust 
their accounts or records to reflect the concluded transaction.  
Using an intermediary, which may independently maintain records 
or accounts on the parties to ensure each party has sufficient value 
or worth to complete a proposed exchange, as a way to guarantee 
that a transaction is ultimately honored by all parties, thereby 
minimizing risk, remains a fundamental, abstract concept.
300
 
This explanation has three sentences. The first sentence merely 
states that the alleged abstract idea is a basic concept.  The second 
sentence states the idea again almost verbatim.  Finally, the third 
sentence, in italics, clarifies the idea. 
This idea is not a science concept. First, the idea fails to place 
objects into classes (e.g., expensive or cheap), so it is not a 
classificatory science concept.  Second, the idea fails to compare 
objects (e.g., account A worth more than account B), so the idea is not 
a comparative science concept.  Third, the idea fails to fix objects to a 
number range (e.g., tagging accounts with dollar values), so the idea 
is not a quantitative science concept. 
2. In Science-Law Form 
Science laws may be universal or statistical.  They describe large 
numbers of phenomena.  Here, the science law must have something 
to do with: 
[U]sing an intermediary, which may independently maintain 
records or accounts on the parties to ensure each party has 
sufficient value or worth to complete a proposed exchange, as a 
way to guarantee that a transaction is ultimately honored by all 
 
 299. CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp., 768 F. Supp. 2d 221, 243-44 (D.D.C. 2011), rev’d, 
685 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2012), and reh’g en banc granted, opinion vacated, No. 2011-1301, 
2012 WL 4784336 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 9, 2012). 
 300. Id. (emphasis added). 
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parties, thereby minimizing risk.
301
 
Replacing “to ensure” with “ensures” makes a universal science 
law: 
[U]sing an intermediary, which may independently maintain 
records or accounts on the parties [ensures] each party has 
sufficient value or worth to complete a proposed exchange, as a 
way to guarantee that a transaction is ultimately honored by all 
parties, thereby minimizing risk.
302
 
Ignoring “as a way . . . minimizing risk,” as a redundant 
description, this sentence makes an absolute statement required for a 
science law form: “using an intermediary . . . ensures each party has 
sufficient value/worth to complete a proposed exchange.”  Thus, the 
district court’s abstract idea has the form of a science law. 
But is this sentence a universal science law?  If “ensures”‘ means 
“absolutely guarantees,” then the sentence makes an absolute 
statement required for a universal science law.  As the district court 
explained, “ensures”‘ is “a way to guarantee.”303  But, even if 
“ensures” means “makes more likely,” then the sentence makes a 
probabilistic statement required for a statistical science law.  Even so, 
it is unclear whether either the district court’s statement really is a 
universal science law. 
Regardless, I take the district court’s “abstract idea” as a science 
law and construct the downward abstraction ladder for the claims at 
issue. 
C. Method Claims 68 in ‘510 Patent & 33 in ‘479 Patent. 
The most important issue is whether one can construct a non-
trivial downward ladder from this alleged abstract idea in the claims 
to the actual claims.  As science laws often describe causes and 
effects, method claims are especially amenable to comparison with 
science laws.  In essence, making a downward abstractions ladder 
adds features to the alleged science concept or law to try to reach the 
claim. 
1. Non-Trivial “Electronically Adjusting” to reach ‘510 
Patent’s Patent-Eligible Claim 68 
Claim 68’s preamble states “[a] method of exchanging an 
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obligation between parties, wherein an exchange obligation is 
administered by a supervisory institution, the method performed by 
the supervisory institution.”304  Rearranging the preamble, it states, “a 
supervisory institution administers an exchange obligation between 
parties.” 
This preamble differs from the alleged “abstract idea.’  Unlike 
the “abstract idea,” this preamble says nothing about ensuring “each 
party has sufficient value/worth to complete a proposed exchange.”  
But, the phrase, “using an intermediary” seems equivalent to 
“supervisory institution administers an exchange . . . between 
parties,” if one excludes “obligation.”  Of less import, but still 
different, the “intermediary” is a “supervisory institution.”  Thus, 
claim 68’s preamble only has “using an intermediary” but not 
“ensures each party has sufficient value/worth to complete a proposed 
exchange.” 
Does the rest of claim 68 add trivial features to the abstract idea?  
Claim 68 requires “electronically adjusting said first account and 
said second account in order to effect the exchange obligation 
between said first party and said second party after ensuring that said 
first party and said second party have adequate value in said first 
account and said third account, respectively. . . .”305  The unitalicized 
text is equivalent to the phrase, “ensures each party has sufficient 
value/worth to complete said proposed exchange” in the alleged 
abstract idea.  But, the italicized text adds a feature to the alleged 
abstract idea; the alleged abstract idea says nothing about 
“electronically adjusting” anything. 
This addition has import.  Claims must be read in the 
specification’s light.306  The specification includes the claims.307  
Even so, without referring to the other claims or the rest of the 
specification, the alleged abstract idea alone “using an intermediary,” 
could include a supervisory institution or a person sending postal mail 
between parties or a person shaking hands with each party.  
“Electronically adjusting” takes claim 68 away from a trivial addition 
in a downward abstraction from the alleged idea.  Thus, the 
downward abstraction ladder from the alleged abstraction idea cannot 
 
 304. U.S. Patent No. 6,912,510 col. 67 ll. 38-42 (filed May 9, 2000) (issued Jun. 28, 2005). 
 305. Id. at col. 68 ll. 7-13 (emphasis added). 
 306. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (quoting In re Am. 
Acad. Sci. Tech. Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004); 37 C.F.R. § 1.75(d)(1) (2012)); see 
also MPEP, supra note 103, at § 2111. 
 307. 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.75(a), (d). 
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reach claim 68. 
Thus, method claim 68 is patent-eligible in this analysis.  
Though claim 68 should be patent-eligible when tested against the 
district court’s idea, this analysis says nothing about whether claim 
68 is, or is not, novel or non-obvious. 
2. ‘479 Patent’s Claim 33 Fails 35 U.S.C. § 112—Moot 
Eligibility 
Claim 33: 
33. A method of exchanging obligations as between parties, each 
party holding a credit record and a debit record with an exchange 
institution, the credit records and debit records for exchange of 
predetermined obligations, the method comprising the steps of: 
(a) creating a shadow credit record and a shadow debit record for 
each stakeholder party to be held independently by a supervisory 
institution from the exchange institutions; 
(b) obtaining from each exchange institution a start-of-day balance 
for each shadow credit record and shadow debit record; 
(c) for every transaction resulting in an exchange obligation, the 
supervisory institution adjusting each respective party’s shadow 
credit record or shadow debit record, allowing only these 
transactions that do not result in the value of the shadow debit 
record being less than the value of the shadow credit record at any 
time, each said adjustment taking place in chronological order; and 
(d) at the end-of-day, the supervisory institution instructing ones of 
the exchange institutions to exchange credits or debits to the credit 
record and debit record of the respective parties in accordance with 
the adjustments of the said permitted transactions, the credits and 
debits being irrevocable, time invariant obligations placed on the 
exchange institutions.
308
 
a. Facially Ambiguous Subject Matter—“Exchange 
Institutions” & “Ones” 
Title 35 Section 112(b) requires the “claims particularly point[] 
out and distinctly claim[] the subject matter the applicant regards as 
his invention.” 
First, claim 33’s “exchange institutions,” is ambiguous.  Step (a) 
refers to “the exchange institutions,” but the only possible antecedent 
is the preamble’s singular “an exchange institution.”  This antecedent 
 
 308. U.S. Patent 5,970,479 col. 65 ll. 23-50 (filed  May 28, 1993) (issued Oct. 19, 1999) 
(emphasis added). 
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mismatch is especially confusing as “a supervisory institution” seems 
to be at least part of, if not the same as, the “exchange institution.”  
Also, step (d) requires “the supervisory institution instructing ones of 
the exchange institutions.”  Again, the “supervisory institution” may 
be the “exchange institution[].” 
Second, the odd “ones” phrase defies comprehension as it is both 
singular and plural, and “instructing ones of the exchange 
institutions” may or may not refer to the preamble’s singular “an 
exchange institution,” the earlier “exchange institutions,” or both.  
How many is “ones”? 
b. Prosecution History Leaves “Exchange” & 
“Ones” Ambiguous 
Interpreting a patent claim demands looking closely at its 
prosecution history.
309
 Rather than skipping this key step, I expressly 
examine the history. 
1. Only § 103 Obviousness Rejections 
Independent claim 33 seems to have been filed as claim 32 in the 
original U.S. application on May 28, 1993.
310
  On July 31, 1996, Peter 
K. Trzyna of Baker & McKenzie sent a Preliminary Amendment 
adding claims 34-38.
311
 
On January 23, 1997, the USPTO issued the First Office 
Action.
312
  It rejected all the claims, 1-38, under 35 U.S.C. Section 
103.
313
 On July 23, 1997, Rob Sokohl filed an amendment;
314
 it left 
 
 309. See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 30-31 (1997) 
(unanimous). 
 310. See Patent Appl. (May 28, 1993), ‘479 Patent, http://portal.uspto.gov/pair/PublicPair 
(select “Patent Number” bubble; search “5,970,479” as patent number; follow “Image File 
Wrapper” tab; download “Claims” document received May 28, 1993). 
 311. Prelim. Amend. (July 31, 1996),‘479 Patent, http://portal.uspto.gov/pair/PublicPair 
(select “Patent Number” bubble; search “5,970,479” as patent number; follow “Image File 
Wrapper” tab; download  “Change of Address,” “Transmittal Letter,” “Applicant Arguments/ 
Remarks Made in an Amendment,” “Claims,” and “Amendment/Req. Reconsideration-After 
Non-Final Reject (sic),” documents received Aug. 2, 1996). 
 312. Non-Final Rej’n (Jan. 23, 1997), ‘479 Patent, http://portal.uspto.gov/pair/PublicPair 
(select “Patent Number” bubble; search “5,970,479” as patent number; follow “Image File 
Wrapper” tab; download “Notice of Formal Drawings Required,” “List of References cited by 
applicant and considered by examiner,” “List of references cited by examiner,” and “Non-Final 
Rejection” documents [hereinafter First Office Action]. 
 313. First Office Action, supra note 312, at 2-4. 
 314. Amend. & Resp. under 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.111 & 1.115 (Jul. 23, 1997), ‘479 Patent, 
http://portal.uspto.gov/pair/PublicPair (select “Patent Number” bubble; search “5,970,479” as 
patent number; follow “Image File Wrapper” tab; download “Extension of Time,” “Transmittal 
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claim 32 unchanged.
315
 
On October 29, 1997, Sokohl interviewed Examiner Barton 
Bainbridge to discuss “whether the customized contract of the 
preamble” in independent data processing system claims 34-38 
“should be given patentable weight.”316 
On November 13, 1997, the USPTO finally rejected all claims, 
1-39, under Section 103.
317
  On January 12, 1998, Sokohl responded 
to the Final Rejection by arguing without amending any claims.
318
 
On January 29, 1998, Sokohl interviewed Bainbridge by phone, 
and they agreed the claims were allowable.
319
 
2. One or Two Exchange Institutions & How 
Many is “Ones”? 
The arguments against the 103 rejections only suggest the 
supervisory institution is separate from an exchange institution. 
Exchanging obligations manifestly implies at least two parties.  
Trzyna and Sokohl never changed claim 33, originally filed as claim 
32.  Sokohl’s July 23, 1997 Amendment and Response to the First 
Office Action discussed claim 32: 
The present invention recites in claim 32 a method for exchanging 
obligations as between parties. The creation of a shadow credit and 
debit record for each stakeholder party to be held independently by 
a supervisory institution is recited in claim 32, part (a). These 
shadow records initially contain the start-of-day balances of all 
parties’ credit and debit records, and are adjusted during the day 
 
Letter,” “Applicant Arguments/Remarks Made in an Amendment,” “Claims,” and 
“Amendment/Req. Reconsideration-After Non-Final Reject” documents received July 23, 1997) 
[hereinafter Amend. & Resp. to First Office Action]. 
 315. Id. 
 316. Interview Summ. (Oct. 29, 1997), ‘479 Patent, http://portal.uspto.gov/pair/PublicPair 
(select “Patent Number” bubble; search “5,970,479” as patent number; follow “Image File 
Wrapper” tab; download “Examiner Interview Summary Record (PTOL – 413)” (Nov. 13, 
1997)). 
 317. Final Rej’n at 2–8 (Nov. 13, 1997), ‘479 Patent, http://portal.uspto.gov/pair/ 
PublicPair (select “Patent Number” bubble; search “5,970,479” as patent number; follow 
“Image File Wrapper” tab; download “Final Rejection”). 
 318. Reply under 37 C.F.R. § 1.116 (Jan. 12, 1998), ‘479 Patent, http://portal.uspto.gov/ 
pair/PublicPair (select “Patent Number” bubble; search “5,970,479” as patent number; follow 
“Image File Wrapper” tab; download “Transmittal Letter,” “Change of Address,” 
“Miscellaneous Incoming Letter,” “Applicant Arguments/Remarks Made in an Amendment,” 
“Amendment/Req. Reconsideration-After Non-Final Reject”) [hereinafter Reply to Final Rej’n]. 
 319. Interview Summ. (Jan. 23, 1998), ‘479 Patent, http://portal.uspto.gov/pair/PublicPair 
(select “Patent Number” bubble; search “5,970,479” as patent number; follow “Image File 
Wrapper” tab; download “Examiner Interview Summary Record (PTOL – 413)”). 
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for every transaction resulting in an exchange obligation. Claim 32 
recites that at the end-of-day, these shadow credit and debit records 
are exchanged with the credit record and debit record of the 
respective parties, in accordance with the adjustments of the 
permitted transactions, making the credit and debits irrevocable.
320
 
I read “exchanged with . . . the respective parties” to mean the 
supervisory institution sends its shadow record information to each 
party’s exchange institution.  This clears the ambiguity between 
exchange and supervisory institutions. 
Even so, this argument fails to state whether both parties use one 
exchange institution, or whether each party has a different exchange 
institution.  Sokohl’s January 12, 1998 Reply to the Final Rejection 
mentioned claim 32 in passing,
321
 but failed to expressly discuss it.  
The Reply never mentions “institution.”  The patent, the Correction 
Certificate, and the prosecution fail to cure the antecedent basis and 
“ones” ambiguities, so claim 33’s subject matter remains unclear. 
Thus, claim 33 fails to meet Section 112(b).  As claim 33’s 
subject matter is unclear, claim 33’s subject matter eligibility under 
Section 101 is moot. 
D. Apparatus/System Claims 14 in ‘375 Patent & 68 in ‘720 
Patent—Patent-Eligible By “Electronically Adjust” 
Though in a different patent, claim 14 only differs from claim 68 
by adding, in italics above, “a communications controller” where the 
“computer . . . receive[s] a transaction from said communications 
controller.”322  Thus, claim 14, in essence, “depends” on claim 68, so 
claim 68 is likely more abstract than claim 14. 
It is only likely more abstract because, against conventional 
wisdom, merely adding words to a claim fails to necessarily make a 
narrower claim.  For instance, “B is determined by A,” is narrower 
than, “B is determined, at least in part, by A.”323  And, as claim 14 
does not really depend on claim 68, unless through a common 
prosecution history, claim differentiation doctrine
324
 fails to presume 
that claim 14 is narrower than claim 68. 
The abstractions ladder and comparison are slightly different 
from the method claims.  Science law statements often describe acts 
 
 320. Amend. & Resp. to First Office Action, supra note 314, at 14 (emphasis added). 
 321. Reply to Final Rej’n, supra note 318, at 6. 
 322. Compare ‘375 Patent col. 66 ll. 1-30, with ‘720 Patent col. 69 ll. 20-42. 
 323. Interview with Paul Hickman, in Palo Alto, Cal. (1994). 
 324. E.g., Envtl. Designs Ltd. v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 713 F.2d 693, 699 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 
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and effects.  These statements fit well with method claims describing 
steps or acts, but an apparatus/system is not a cause, effect, or act.  
Echoing Justice Breyer’s Prometheus opinion, an apparatus cannot be 
eligible if it merely implements a science law.
325
  Thus, the 
abstractions ladder will test whether the apparatus or machine merely 
implements a science law. 
The district court’s science law (i.e., “abstract idea”) was “using 
an intermediary . . . ensures each party has sufficient value/worth to 
complete a proposed exchange.”326  Claim 68’s preamble claims “a 
data processing system to enable the exchange of an obligation 
between parties.”327  This includes “using an intermediary.” 
System claim 68’s structure elements are the data storage unit 
and a computer.  Claim 68 includes a computer “electronically 
adjust[ing] said first account and said third account in order to effect 
an exchange obligation . . . .”328  “Electronically adjusting” was a non-
trivial feature making patent 510’s method claim eligible.  Thus, 
“electronically adjusting” can also make the system claim eligible if 
the rest of the claim is no more abstract than the district court’s 
abstract idea. 
What part of claim 68 corresponds to the remainder of the 
abstract idea, that is, “ensures each party has sufficient value/worth to 
complete a proposed exchange?”329  The computer “electronically 
adjust[s]” the accounts after “ensuring that said first party and/or said 
second party have adequate value in said first account and/or said 
second account, respectively.”330  This “ensuring” phrase differs only 
trivially from the district court’s “ensures each party has sufficient 
value/worth . . . .”331  Thus, as with the method claims, “electronically 
adjust,” takes system claim 68 away from a trivial addition in a 
downward abstraction from the alleged idea.  So, the downward 
abstraction ladder from the alleged abstraction idea cannot reach 
system claim 68, and system claim 68 should be patent-eligible. 
As system claim 14, in effect, adds a controller to claim 68, 
claim 14 is also eligible.  As with the method claims, this analysis 
 
 325. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1297 (2012). 
 326. CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp., 768 F. Supp. 2d 221, 243 (D.D.C. 2011), rev’d, 685 
F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2012), and reh’g en banc granted, opinion vacated, No. 2011-1301, 2012 
WL 4784336 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 9, 2012) 
 327. ‘720 Patent col. 69 ll. 20-21. 
 328. Id. at col. 69 ll. 29-31. 
 329. CLS Bank Int’l, 768 F. Supp. 2d at 243. 
 330. ‘720 Patent col. 69 ll. 29-30. 
 331. Compare id., with CLS Bank Int’l, 768 F. Supp. 2d at 243. 
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says nothing about whether the system claims 68 and 14 are, or are 
not, novel or non-obvious under 35 U.S.C. Sections 102-103. 
E. ‘375 Patent’s Apparatus/Product Claim 39 Should Fail § 
112 ¶ 2/112(b)—Otherwise Patent-Eligible 
1. Endless-Loop Ambiguity Meets 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 
2/112(b) under Current Law 
The apparatus/product claim 39 claims a “computer program 
product.”332  Unlike the system claims, this product has one 
element—”a computer readable storage medium.”333  Of course, this 
claim seems directed to disk drives, flash drives, CD’s, DVD’s, and 
the like. 
Unlike the method and system claims, claim 39’s preamble, “a 
computer program product,” lacks a clear correspondence to any part 
of the district court’s abstract idea (i.e., “using an intermediary”).  
But, claim 39’s body includes a storage medium “for use by a party to 
exchange an obligation between a first party and a second party.”334  
This phrase surely includes “using an intermediary” which is “a 
party.”335 
a. Facially, Logically, Ambiguous under § 112 ¶ 
2/112(b) 
Claim 39 defines itself in an endless loop.  Claim 39 is to “A 
computer program product comprising a computer readable storage 
medium . . . . the computer program product comprising program 
code. . . .”336  “Comprising” has a special meaning; the claim’s 
preamble comes before it while the claim’s body specifying the claim 
elements comes after it.  Claim 39 has two preambles: “A computer 
program product” and “A computer program product comprising a 
computer readable storage medium for use by a party to exchange an 
obligation between a first party and a second party, the computer 
program product . . . .”337  In other words, the computer program 
product comprises the computer product.  Also, the computer 
program product comprises the computer readable storage medium 
 
 332. ‘375 Patent col. 68 l. 5. 
 333. Id. at col. 68 ll. 5-6. 
 334. Id. at col. 68 ll. 7-8. 
 335. CLS Bank Int’l, 768 F. Supp. 2d at 243. 
 336. ‘375 Patent col. 68 ll. 5-9. 
 337. Id. 
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and, separately, comprises program code. 
Comprising can be used twice in the same claim if no ambiguity 
arises.  For instance, claims may state, “A widget comprising a 
flange; and a housing; the housing further comprising an object and a 
thing.” 
But facially, claim 39 is quite ambiguous.  In essence it claims 
“[a] product comprising a medium, the product comprising a thing.”  
Is the product the medium, the thing, or both? 
And, nothing requires a storage medium claim to have claim 
39’s double comprising form.  In re Beauregard dealt with claims 
involving computer readable media.
338
  Those claims have two forms.  
Claims 1-9 have the form “A widget . . . said widget comprising a 
computer . . . medium . . . having computer program code means in 
said medium, said widget having/including: computer code means . . . 
.” where a widget is either an “an article of manufacture” or a 
“computer program product.”339  Claim 10 differs by listing method 
steps.
340
  The patent claim at issue in CyberSource Corp. v. Retail 
Decisions, Inc. also listed method steps.
341
 
b. Double-Comprising Format Matches Beauregard’s 
Claim 1 
Though In re Beauregard had claims without the double 
comprising format, its claim 1 did use claim 39’s double comprising 
format.  Thus, claim 39 meets Section 112(b) under current case law. 
2. Non-Trivial Additions to Reach the Computer Program 
Product 
Applying the same abstraction ladder to the district’s science law 
(i.e., “abstract idea”) likely makes claim 39 eligible. 
But, an “abstract idea” for an article of manufacture should be a 
natural object, natural phenomenon, or math relationship, rather than 
the district court’s science law.  An “object” might be described by a 
mathematical formula, like an equation for a circle or sphere.
342
 
 
 338. In re Beauregard, 53 F.3d 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1997); U.S. Patent No. 5,710,578 (filed 
May 9, 1990) (issued Jan. 20, 1998). 
 339. ‘578 Patent col. 16 ll. 33-41, col. 16 ll. 53-62, col. 17 ll. 16-25, 57-64, col. 18 ll. 17-
25, 44-52, col. 19 ll. 36-45, col. 20 ll. 3-12, 37-47 (emphasis added). 
 340. Id. at col. 21 l. 40-col. 22 l. 4. 
 341. CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2011) 
(quoting Ex Parte Reexamination Certificate col. 2 ll. 9-14, U.S. Patent No. 6,029,154 C1 
(requested Oct. 26, 2004) (issued Aug. 5, 2008)). 
 342. Young, supra note 11. 
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It is hard to think of an instance where a computer memory, 
regardless of what software it contains, would be deemed a natural 
object or phenomenon with trivial features.  The only natural 
“phenomenon” readily coming to mind is a magnetized rock.  Thus, it 
is hard to think of a computer readable medium that would fail 
Section 101 eligibility. 
CONCLUSION 
This paper has presented a new way to decide subject matter 
eligibility for a utility patent.  It posits patent law’s abstract ideas are 
science concepts, and science laws composed of science concepts, as 
defined by science philosophers.  Science concepts and science laws 
must have particular word forms. 
Inspired by copyright law, a Hand abstractions test allows 
judging whether a patent claim is an abstract idea, natural law, or 
natural phenomenon.  Patent claims manifest an innate vertical 
abstractions ladder, so there is no need to further abstract ideas from 
the claims.  To combat human compulsions and the test’s known 
over-abstraction bias, the fact-finder must first choose the alleged 
science concept, science law, or natural phenomenon.  Then, the fact-
finder must add features to move down the abstractions ladder to see 
whether an independent claim merges with the abstract idea.  The test 
automatically adjusts to ever-changing science concepts and laws and 
their word expressions.  Like a math relation, the test accepts new 
science concepts and science laws at the ladder’s top to test against 
patent claims.  Thus, the test need not change as science advances. 
As it is impossible to test a claim’s subject matter eligibility 
without knowing a claim’s subject matter, a claim should first pass 35 
U.S.C. Section 112(b) before deciding subject-matter eligibility under 
35 U.S.C. Section 101. 
This downward patent-eligibility Hand abstractions test gives a 
much more coherent, systematic, and practical approach to judging 
patent-eligibility than has appeared in recent court opinions and 
articles. 
 
